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I. INTRODUCTION 
An employee of an international organization misappropri-
ates over one million dollars from a United Nations Peace-
Keeping Mission’s designated for procurement of supplies.  As 
a staff member of an international organization, he or she has 
functional immunity and cannot be investigated by the local ju-
risdiction or by authorities in his home country.  Is this the 
“perfect crime”?  Taking into consideration that these misap-
propriated funds are contributions from Member States of the 
United Nations, is there any recourse to investigate the facts of 
the incident to determine culpability?  
 International organizations have a legal obligation to en-
sure compliance with internal regulations, rules and policies.  
This includes the breach of employment obligations in the UN.  
Investigations internal to the United Nations are unique.  The 
United Nations has partners in all parts of the globe: the inves-
tigators may be located in New York, the incident may have oc-
curred in Africa, and the witnesses may be on a new assign-
ment in Asia.  In addition to geographic separation, United 
Nations’ investigations may have to contend with a range of 
different languages, dialects, cultures, customs and ethnic is-
sues.  These are all factors that affect an investigator’s capabil-
ity to investigate allegations of staff misconduct or irregular 
procurement procedures in the United Nations.  
 The United Nations has become aware that internal in-
vestigations must be conducted carefully taking into considera-
3
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tion the staff member’s due process rights.  If an investigation 
does not observe the standards of good investigative practices 
in the investigation process, the Organization may be held fi-
nancially liable through the newly established U.N. internal 
administration of justice.  As a result, the United Nations has 
recognized the need to develop a properly planned and careful-
ly conducted internal investigation. 
II. WHY DOES THE UNITED NATIONS NEED OVERSIGHT IN 
INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS? 
The most significant benefit of a good internal investiga-
tion is that it enables management to obtain the evidence it 
needs to manage effectively.  Additionally, negligent or corrupt 
staff can be trained, disciplined or discharged.  An investiga-
tion provides management with an important tool to identify 
fundamental changes necessary to ensure an organization’s fu-
ture well–being.  An investigation is not without risks; it may 
uncover information that may establish senior manager’s in-
volvement in potential wrong-doing.  A poorly managed inves-
tigation could also disrupt business operations and possibly 
cause unwanted negative publicity.  It is therefore in the best 
interests of an organization to seize the initiative and investi-
gate to forestall any implication of a cover-up of fraudulent ac-
tivities.  Timely investigations will allow UN management to 
control the timing and disclosure of publicity, which may occur 
in a highly public and sensitive case.  Investigations may also 
reveal that there was no misconduct on behalf of the staff 
member, allowing for the resumption of normal operations.    
An internal investigation may have as its general purpose 
the investigation of improprieties or wrongdoing by manage-
ment, the discipline or discharge of a staff member, the location 
of missing company assets, or the disclosure of certain data.1 
The purpose must be clearly stated and known to all parties 
involved in the investigation.  When the purpose of the investi-
gation is known, the investigation must set out facts, both fa-
vorable and unfavorable.  If the purpose is to uncover evidence 
of employee misconduct, the method of interrogation might by 
itself expose an organization to liability or create inadmissible 
                                                             
1 Warren Freedman, Internal Company Investigations and the Employ-
ment Relationship 1, 3 (1994).  
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evidence that would be useless in subsequent disciplinary hear-
ings.    
Misconduct by staff members may range from misappro-
priation of funds to falsification of employee entitlements, 
physical assault, and sexual harassment.  The UN has a duty 
to create an internal system, which provides adequate notice to 
staff as to what behavior is acceptable and what behavior is not 
acceptable.  A crucial question in all investigations is when the 
Organization should advise the suspect staff member that he or 
she is under investigation.2 There is no definitive time since 
the outcome of the investigation depends upon the unique facts 
of the alleged impropriety or wrongdoing. 
Since the investigation is conducted by an international 
organization, the United States constitutional issues do not ap-
ply. UN staff members under investigation cannot invoke the 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination or the 
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. In the United States, the Fourth Amendment protects 
an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy from unrea-
sonable searches. The United States Supreme Court has held 
that searches and seizures by governmental supervisors of pri-
vate property of employees are subject to the restraints of the 
Fourth Amendment.  In O’Connor v. Ortega, the United States 
Supreme Court held that in “searches conducted by a public 
employer, we must balance the invasion of the employees’ legit-
imate expectations of privacy against the government’s need 
for supervision, control and the efficient operation of the work-
place.”3 The United States Supreme Court held that for a pub-
lic employer or government to intrude on the interests of gov-
ernment employees for work-related purposes and for 
investigations of work-related misconduct, the intrusion on the 
constitutionally protected privacy interests should be judged by 
the standards of reasonableness under the circumstances.  Alt-
hough the United States Fourth Amendment does not apply to 
the UN, the principle of the legitimate expectations of privacy 
of the staff member versus the interests of the UN in investiga-
                                                             
2 Id. at 2-3. 
3 O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (holding that public employees 
had Fourth Amendment protections during administrative searches in the 
workplace, and that routine work-related intrusions did not constitute a vio-
lation). 
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tions of work-related misconduct should also be judged by a 
standard of reasonableness. 
The concept of “due process” is central to the UN and staff 
member relations, as it is in other aspects of law.  The UN has 
a right to expect cooperation from its staff members in an in-
vestigation.  The UN operates in a dichotomous role: it must 
conduct internal investigations carefully yet minimize the dis-
closure of the investigation to the staff and the public prior to a 
final decision taken by the Secretary-General.  Staff members 
have expectations of fairness in the workplace; an organization 
has responsibilities in the management of staff.  A staff mem-
ber has a right to know what is expected of him or her and 
what the consequences will be of not fulfilling those expecta-
tions.  The staff member has a right to consistent and predicta-
ble responses by the Organization to violations of rules of con-
duct.  The staff member has a right to fair discipline based on 
the facts discovered in an internal investigation.  He or she has 
a right to question the facts found in the internal investigation 
and to offer and present a defense.  In the United Nations, a 
staff member has the right to appeal a disciplinary decision to 
a judicial tribunal to ensure that his or her rights are protected 
under due process of law.   
One element of due process is the obligation of the employ-
er to conduct a fair fact-finding process.  The right choice of an 
investigator by the Organization is important.  The purpose of 
conducting appropriate investigations and developing compre-
hensive policies and training is to minimize liability.  Selecting 
the appropriate investigator or the right investigating team is 
an effective tool for conducting an internal investigation.  
Why does the UN need oversight in internal investiga-
tions?  The UN, governed by the General Assembly composed of 
193 Member States, is important as a multilateral forum for 
the discussion of global issues.  The world is always watching 
the UN.  The Member States also fund the UN and expect 
transparency and accountability in the expenditure of public 
funds.  In turn, the UN has to demonstrate not only to the 
Member States, but to the general public that it accords its 
staff with the same principles as guided by the UN Charter.  
Good governance in the UN requires internal oversight of staff 
members and UN operations to strengthen the integrity and 
respect for the UN.    
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss2/2
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These are the general principles of investigation for the 
UN. The United Nations has an independent investigation di-
vision within its institutional structure. Below is a discussion 
of the Investigations Division, Office of Internal Oversight Ser-
vices, the section mandated to conduct investigations within 
the UN.    
III. MANDATE OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO CONDUCT INTERNAL 
INVESTIGATIONS  
 A. Office of Internal Oversight Services   
The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) was es-
tablished pursuant to the decision of the General Assembly in 
its resolution of 48/218 B on August 12, 1994.4 OIOS exercises 
operational independence under the authority of the Secretary-
General “in accordance with Article 97 of the Charter 
[OIOS]have the authority to initiate, carry out and report on 
any action which it considers necessary to fulfill its responsibil-
ities in regards to monitoring, internal audit, inspection and 
evaluation and investigations as set forth in the resolution.”5 
Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 48/218 B, the 
Secretary-General established OIOS to carry out and report on 
any action with regards to monitoring, internal audits, inspec-
tions, evaluations, and investigations.  The executive manager 
of OIOS is the Under-Secretary-General (hereinafter the 
“USG”).  The USG is accountable to the Secretary-General, but 
exercises operational independence.  The USG is responsible 
for all administrative activities of the OIOS and advises the 
Secretary-General on oversight issues and oversees the imple-
mentation of internal strategic organizational plans and goals.  
The Internal Audit Division, the Inspections and Evaluation 
Division, and the Investigations Division are each headed by 
Directors who are accountable to the USG for OIOS.    
                                                             
4 Review of the Efficiency of the Administrative and Financial Function-
ing of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 48/218 B, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/218 
(Aug. 12, 1994). (granting OIOS the assumed functions of the abolished Unit-
ed Nations Office for Inspections and Investigations), available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/oios/ied/ A_RES_48_218_B.pdf [hereinafter “Review 
of the Efficiency of the Administrative and Financial Functioning of the Unit-
ed Nations”]. 
5 Id. at ¶ 5(a).   
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B. Investigations Division 
This Article will focus on the work of the Investigations 
Division whose mandate is to investigate reports of violations 
of United Nations regulations, rules and pertinent administra-
tive issuances.  The General Assembly resolution 48/218 B 
mandated the Investigations Division to “investigate reports of 
violations of United Nations regulations, rules and pertinent 
administrative issuances and transmit to the Secretary-
General the results of such investigations together with appro-
priate recommendations to guide the Secretary-General in de-
ciding on jurisdictional or disciplinary action to be taken.”6 Fol-
lowing General Assembly resolution 48/218 B, the Secretary-
General promulgated the Secretary-General’s Bulletin, “Estab-
lishment of the Office of Internal Oversight Services,” 
ST/SGB/273 on September 7, 1994, which defined the functions 
of the OIOS.7    The Secretary-General’s Bulletin described the 
activities of the Investigations Division as to assess the poten-
tial within programs areas for fraud and other violations 
through the analysis of systems of control in high-risk opera-
tions as well as offices away from Headquarters.  On the basis 
of the analysis by the Investigations Division, recommenda-
tions are made for corrective action to minimize the risk of 
commission of violations.8 
U.N. Secretary-General, Bulletin on Ethics Office: Estab-
lishment and Terms of Reference, U.N.Doc. ST/SGB/2005/22, at 
¶ 1.1 (Dec. 30, 2005) [hereinafter Establishment and Terms of 
Reference]. 
The UN Secretariat Information Circular, ST/IC/1996/29 
on April 25, 1996, on “Terms of Reference for Investigations by 
the Office of Internal Oversight Services,” identified the juris-
diction of the Investigation Division to investigate  
(i) program areas for fraud and other violations through the 
analysis of systems of control in high-risk operations, as well as 
offices away from headquarters; and (ii) to receive reports from 
staff and other persons engaged in activities under the authority 
                                                             
6 Id. at ¶ 5(c)(iv). 
7 U.N. Secretary-General, Bulletin, Establishment of the Office of Inter-
nal Oversight Services, ¶ ¶ 10-24, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/273 (Sept. 7, 1994), 
available at www.un.org/Depts/oios/documents/st_sgb273.pdf.  
8 Id. at ¶ 17.  
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of the Organization suggesting improvements in program activity 
and reporting perceived cases of possible violations of regulations 
or rules as well as possible cases of (a) mismanagement, (b) mis-
conduct, (c) waste of resources or (d) abuse of authority.9  
The Information Circular extended the Investigation Divi-
sion’s jurisdiction to receive and investigate reports from staff 
and other persons relating to alleged breaches of the Charter of 
the United Nations, the UN Staff Regulations and Staff Rules, 
other pertinent administrative issuances and decisions of the 
(former) United Nations Administrative Tribunal.  Alleged 
breaches of the standards of conduct defined misconduct as ac-
tivities that would constitute a failure to maintain the highest 
standard of conduct and unsatisfactory performance defined as 
lapses from the requirement of staff to perform in accordance 
with the highest standards of efficiency and competence.  
The Secretary-General’s Bulletin ST/SGB/1998/2 on Feb-
ruary 12, 1998 on “Organization of the Office of Internal Over-
sight Services” further defined the core functions of the Inves-
tigations Division as conducting fact-finding investigations.10 
The Bulletin reaffirmed OIOS’s operational independence, un-
der the Secretary-General’s authority, to initiate, carry out, 
and report on any action which it considers necessary to fulfill 
its responsibilities with regards to monitoring, internal audits, 
inspections, evaluations and investigations.11As stated in the 
Secretary-General’s Bulletin, the Investigations Division has a 
                                                             
9 U.N. Secretary General, Information Circular, Terms of Reference for 
Investigations by the Office of Internal Oversight Services, ¶ 3,  U.N. Doc. 
ST/IC/1996/29 (Apr. 25, 1996), available at 
www.un.org/Depts/oios/documents/st_ic1996_29.pdf; see also U.N. Secretary-
General, Bulletin, Ethics Office: Establishment and Terms of Reference, ¶ 1.1 
, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/2005/22 (Dec. 30, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/ 
Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=ST/SGB/2005/22 [hereinafter “Establishment and 
Terms of Reference”]. 
10 U.N. Secretary-General, Bulletin, Organization of the Office of Internal 
Oversight Services, ST/SGB/1998/2 (Feb. 12, 1998), available at 
http://www.un.org/ Depts/oios/documents/st_sgb1998_2.pdf.   
11 Id. (referencing the establishment of the Office of Internal Oversight 
Services and dividing OIOS into the following sections: the Central Evalua-
tion Unit to strengthen evaluation oversight activities; the Audit and Man-
agement Consulting Division to conduct financial, operational and manage-
ment audits for UN activities; the Central Monitoring and Inspection Unit to 
establish a system of program monitoring; and the Investigations Section to 
receive and investigate reports of violations of UN regulations, rules, and 
administrative issuances). 
9
2. TAMARA SHOCKLEY (DO NOT DELETE) 7/14/2015  4:40 PM 
 
478                       PACE INT’L L. REV.                [Vol.  XXVII::2 
    
 
broad based investigative authority and cannot be prohibited 
from carrying out any action within the purview of its man-
date. The Investigations Division has the delegated authority 
to initiate and carry out investigations without any need for 
prior clearance.  The bulletin also provided the Investigation 
Division with the responsibility to assess whether potential 
fraud existed within program areas and other violations 
through the analysis of systems of control in high-risk opera-
tions as well as offices away from headquarters and make rec-
ommendations for corrective action to minimize the risk of 
commission of such violations.12  
On January 31, 2000, the General Assembly conducted a 
review of the implementation of General Assembly resolution 
48/218 B.13 General Assembly resolution 54/244 stated that in 
respect of the investigation functions of OIOS, the Secretary-
General must provide procedures to protect individual rights of 
staff, including those of staff members making reports to the 
Investigations Section, and to regulate due process and fair-
ness for all parties concerned.14  This was the first substantive 
referral to the protection of “whistleblowers” in the UN.  The 
General Assembly expressed interest in the rules and proce-
dures to be applied to the investigation functions performed by 
OIOS in order to ensure fairness and to avoid possible abuses 
in the investigation process.  
In the “Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services 
on strengthening the investigation functions in the United Na-
tions”, A/58/708 on Feb. 10, 2004, OIOS developed additional 
categories of cases for investigation to include classification of 
either high-risk Category I cases and low-risk Category II cas-
es.15 OIOS determined that inquiries into serious matters 
would be handled by independent, professionally trained, and 
                                                             
12 Id. at ¶ 8.2(d).  
13 See Review of the Efficiency of the Administrative and Financial Func-
tioning of the United Nations, supra note 4. 
14 G.A. Res. 54/244, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/244 (Jan. 31, 2000), avail-
able at http://www.un.org/Depts/oios/ied/A_RES_54_244.pdf. 
15 Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on strengthening 
the investigation functions in the United Nations, G.A. Res. 58/708, , ¶¶ 26 - 
27, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/708 (Feb. 10, 2004), available at https://cdu.unlb.org 
/Portals/0/PdfFiles/PolicyDocL.pdf [hereinafter “Report of the Office of Inter-
nal Oversight Services on strengthening the investigation functions in the 
United Nations”].   
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experienced investigators; these cases would be classified as 
Category I.  Category I cases would be considered as serious 
high-risk cases to be conducted by professional and experienced 
investigators.  If a program manager identified such a case, the 
matter would be referred to professional investigators in OIOS.  
Category I cases would include matters such as the following:16  
 Serious or complex fraud;  
 Other serious criminal act activity:  
 Abuse of authority or staff:  
 Conflict of interest:  
 Gross mismanagement:  
 Wasted substantial resources:  
 All cases involving risk of loss of life to staff or too others, 
including witnesses:  
 Substantial violation of United Nations regulations, rules 
were administrative issuances: and  
 Complex proactive investigations aimed at studying and 
reducing risk to life and/or United Nations property.  
General Assembly resolution 59/287, dated April 21, 2005, 
extended Category I cases to include sexual exploitation and 
abuse (SEA).17 The General Assembly considered sexual exploi-
tation and abuse to constitute serious misconduct, which war-
rants investigation by OIOS professional investigators.  In UN 
peacekeeping missions, the Investigations Division has the re-
sponsibility of conducting investigations of sexual exploitation 
and abuse allegations in collaboration with the UN Conduct 
and Discipline Teams based in the missions and, on a case-by 
case basis, the Chief Resident Investigator.  In the United Na-
tions, sexual exploitation and sexual abuse constitutes serious 
misconduct and is strictly prohibited.18  These cases are given 
priority by OIOS, which include sex through coercion or vio-
                                                             
16 Id. at ¶ 26.   
17 Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on strengthening 
the investigation functions in the United Nations, G.A. Res. 59/287, ¶ 6, 
U.N.Doc. A/RES/59/287 (Apr. 21, 2005), available at 
http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m= A/RES/59/287.  
18 U.N. Secretary-General, Bulletin, Special measures for protection from 
sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/2003/13 (Oct. 9, 
2003), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=ST/SGB/2003/13.   
11
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lence and sexual activity with persons under the age of 18.19 
The General Assembly distinguished sexual harassment 
offenses in the workplace, which would be entrusted to the 
United Nations Office of Human Resources Management 
(OHRM) and delineated program managers to conduct sexual 
harassment investigations.20   
Category II cases are considered of lower risk to the Or-
ganization.  These cases include personnel matters, traffic-
related inquiries, simple thefts, contract disputes, office man-
agement disputes, misuse of equipment or staff, basic misman-
agement issues infractions of regulations, and simple entitle-
ment fraud.  Category II cases are handled under the direction 
of United Nations program managers.21 The Investigation Divi-
sion has developed procedures for handling Category II cases 
and, in collaboration with OHRM, trains managers to investi-
gate Category II cases.  
These are the legislative mandates for the creation and the 
oversight of OIOS.  The General Assembly regularly reviews 
the functions and procedures of OIOS, which has resulted in 
changes in operational structure, such as staffing and geo-
graphic representation, and efficiency in the investigations 
process.  The General Assembly resolution 62/582 on December 
12, 2007, “Strengthening Investigations:  The Report of the 
Secretary-General to the General Assembly,” noted the chal-
lenges to OIOS in the areas of financial, economic and adminis-
trative misconduct allegations involving staff and contracted 
third parties (vendors, consultants, and contractors).22 Accord-
ing to the “Report of OIOS to the General Assembly from July 
1, 2010 to June 30, 2011,” investigation matters are currently 
categorized under the following categories: financial, invento-
ry/assets, management, personnel, procurement, programmat-
ic, sexual exploitation and sexual harassment.23 Within the UN 
                                                             
19 Id. at ¶ 3.2(b). 
20 Id. at ¶ 3.3.  
21 Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on strengthening 
the investigation functions in the United Nations, supra note 15, at ¶ 28.   
22 Strengthening Investigations: The Report of the Secretary-General to 
the General Assembly, G. A. Res. 62/582, , ¶ 4, U.N.Doc. A/RES/62/582 (Dec. 
12, 2007), available at 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/62/582.  
23 G.A. Res. 66/286, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/286 (Aug. 10, 2012).  
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Secretariat, procurement irregularities are considered a priori-
ty because they involve financial risks, which have an effect on 
the UN’s public reputation.   
The Investigations Division has placed emphasis on the 
proactive oversight of UN procurement practices.24  
C. Investigations Division Procedures   
OIOS has prepared an “Investigations Manual” to estab-
lish guidelines to conduct internal preliminary fact-finding 
administrative investigations.25  The Investigations Manual 
provides information on investigative techniques, methods and 
procedures.26  As stated in the “Investigations Manual,” OIOS 
has overall responsibility to conduct internal United Nations 
investigations to assist the Secretary-General in fulfilling his 
                                                             
24 A Procurement Task Force was created in January 2006 under author-
ity of the USG for OIOS “to address fraud and corruption in the procurement 
function in the United Nations, both at Headquarters and in the various 
peacekeeping missions.”  OIOS considered that potential risks pertaining to 
outstanding cases in UN procurement activities were of such a large financial 
impact, they and were likely to cause such damage to the financial integrity 
and reputation of the Organization that a separate task force needed to be 
created to address these issues.  The terms of reference of the Procurement 
Task Force was to conduct investigations on matters related to the Procure-
ment Service and examine outstanding procurement cases. Initially the focus 
of the Procurement Task Force was the investigation of eight UN officials 
who had been placed on special leave.  The investigation concluded with six of 
the eight staff members charged with misconduct and one serious case, which 
resulted in a lengthy prison sentence for one UN staff member.  The Pro-
curement Task Force referred a number of cases to national authorities for 
criminal prosecution and recommended civil recovery of monetary damages.  
As of March 2008, the Procurement Task Force published 25 reports that 
dealt with more than 40 contracts, and had completed 142 of the 432 cases in 
its portfolio, with 290 cases remaining to be examined.   
25 See, e.g., UNICEF, Policy Prohibiting and Combatting Fraud and Cor-
ruption, in Exec. Directive dated Aug. 29, 2013 from Executive Director An-
thony Lake to Directors, Representatives, Section Chiefs and, all UNICEF 
Staff, CF/EXD/2013-008 (Aug. 29, 2013); see OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT 
SERVICES, INVESTIGATIONS MANUAL 1 (2009), available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/oios/pages/id_manual_mar2009.pdf [hereinafter “In-
vestigations Manual”]. 
26See Investigations Manual at Foreword (The Investigation Manual con-
tains a caveat that the information in the Manual should be viewed as advi-
sory only and the techniques. The methods and procedures as stated in the 
Manual do not create any substantive rights. This prevents a staff member 
from claiming procedural due process violations if the Investigations Divi-
sions undertakes a different strategy, than stated in the Manual, in the in-
vestigation of a case.). 
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internal oversight responsibilities.27  The Investigations Manu-
al states that, within the UN context, an investigation is a tool 
for collecting facts, yet also a “deterrence against possible im-
propriety” and “a commitment to accountability.”28  The Inves-
tigations Division does not have the authority to issue subpoe-
nas as a law enforcement agency.  UN staff members are 
required to cooperate fully with OIOS investigations.  The In-
vestigations Division has prompt access to all persons engaged 
in activities under the authority of the UN as well as all rec-
ords, documents or other materials assets and premises to ob-
tain information necessary to fulfill its responsibilities.29 
OIOS has discretionary authority to decide which matters 
to investigate.  In disciplinary proceedings OIOS is not respon-
sible for deciding whether to initiate disciplinary proceedings 
or to determine disciplinary action as a result of its reports and 
recommendations.  In accordance with the United Nations Ad-
ministrative Instruction, ST/AI/371/Amend.1, “Revised Disci-
plinary Measures and Procedures,” decisions regarding recom-
mendations for the imposing disciplinary measures shall be 
taken by the Under-Secretary-General for Management on be-
half of the Secretary-General.30  The OIOS investigation and 
the investigation report with the findings and recommenda-
tions are the basis of the UN disciplinary process, which the 
Under-Secretary-General for Management considers in the de-
termination of whether to impose a disciplinary measure.  In 
cases of criminality, OIOS may make a recommendation to the 
UN Office of Legal Affairs for referral to national law enforce-
ment authorities.   
UN staff members  
An investigation determines whether a staff member acted 
in a manner inconsistent with his or her duties and obligations 
towards the UN.  All staff members are subject to the UN Staff 
Regulations and Rules and administrative issuances that in-
form the staff of their duties and obligations.  Staff members 
                                                             
27 Id. at 1. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 U.N. Secretariat, Administrative instruction amending administrative 
instruction ST/AI/371, Revised Disciplinary Measures and Procedures, U.N. 
Doc. ST/AI/371/Amend.1 (May 11, 2010) [hereinafter “Revised Disciplinary 
Measures and Procedures 2010”]. 
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are subject to the UN’s investigative authority.  The Programs 
and Funds each have its own separate investigative authori-
ties.31    
Consultants  
Consultants are independent contractors. They are not ap-
pointed under the UN Staff Regulations and Rules, and are not 
subject to the UN internal disciplinary process.  Contractors 
provide goods or services under a contact and are obligated to 
cooperate fully with an OIOS investigation.  Consultants can 
be subject to investigation by OIOS yet the disciplinary conse-
quences would be termination of the contract.  For example, if a 
contractor engages in corrupt practices, such as bribery or ex-
tortion, the contractor may be debarred from future procure-
ment exercises and the contract terminated.    
Military  
In peace-keeping missions, members of UN Military Ob-
servers, UN Police Officers, Formed Police Units, and law en-
forcement officers on secondment by governments of Member 
States, are all under a duty to cooperate fully with an OIOS in-
vestigation, but are under the disciplinary authority and pro-
cedures of the Sending State.32  If a member of a Formed Police 
Unit commits misconduct, then these units are under the disci-
plinary authority and procedures of the Sending State, and the 
UN cannot undertake disciplinary action against the person-
nel.  A similar approach is accorded to contingent personnel, 
individuals provided by and under the military comment of a 
troop-contributing country (TCC).33  OIOS has the authority to 
investigate the alleged misconduct of contingent military per-
sonnel within the limits of the Agreement with the TCC.  The 
military personnel remain under the command of their nation-
                                                             
31 See Investigations Manual, supra note 15; U.N. DEVELOPMENT 
PROGRAM OFFICE OF AUDIT, INVESTIGATION GUIDELINES (2012), available at 
http://www.undp.org 
/content/dam/undp/documents/about/transparencydocs/OAI_Investigations_G
uidelines.pdf [hereinafter “OAI Investigation Guidelines”]. 
32 U.N. Secretary-General, Model Status-of-Forces Agreement for Peace-
keeping Operations: Rep. of the Secretary General, ¶ 47, U.N. Doc. A/45/594 
(Oct. 9, 1990) [hereinafter “Model Status-of-Forces Agreement for Peacekeep-
ing Operations”]. 
33 Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and Its 
Working Group, G.A. Res. A/61/19/Rev.1, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 66th Sess., 
Supp. No. 19 (Part III), U.N. Doc. A/61/267 (Part III), at 39 (June 12, 2007). 
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al military commander.  If OIOS investigates an allegation of 
misconduct committed by a military member of a TCC, the re-
spective national disciplinary authorities determine whether to 
undertake disciplinary measures.34  
Uniform Guidelines for Investigation  
As stated in the OIOS Investigations Manual “the stand-
ards for OIOS investigations are based on United Nations regu-
lations, rules, and administrative issuances, jurisprudence of 
the [United Nations Dispute Tribunals and the United Nations 
Appeals Tribunals ], General Assembly resolutions, core prin-
ciples and best practices for investigation activities.”35  An ad-
ditional source for investigation standards is the “Uniform 
Guidelines for Investigations” which provides fundamental 
standards for investigations and investigators in the United 
Nations.36  The “Uniform Guidelines for Investigations” provide 
for basic principles including that “investigative findings 
should be based on substantiated facts and related analysis, 
not suppositions or assumption” and recommendations should 
be supported by the investigative findings.37  Investigators in 
the discharge of their duties must abide by the UN Staff Regu-
lations and Rules and maintain strict confidentiality, act with 
objectivity, and disclose any actual or potential conflicts of in-
terest.  
 Investigations Division Internal Procedures  
The Investigations Division has developed internal proce-
dures to be followed for each investigation case.  With the first 
report of possible misconduct comes a process to intake the re-
ceiving, recording, screening, and assigning matters for inves-
tigation.38  The investigation process continues with planning 
                                                             
34 See Model Status-of-Forces Agreement for Peacekeeping Operations 
supra note 32; see also Investigations Manual, supra note 25 (There are other 
categories of personnel that are subject to OIOS investigations.  However, not 
all are subject to UN Regulations and Rules and UN administrative issuanc-
es, such as “Experts on Mission,” UN Volunteers, Interns, and technical coop-
eration experts.).  
35 See Investigations Manual, supra note 25, at 17.   
36 CONFERENCE OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTIGATORS, UNIFORM GUIDELINES 
FOR INVESTIGATIONS (2003), available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/oios/investigation_ manual/ugi.pdf. 
37 See Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on strengthen-
ing the investigation functions in the United Nations, supra note 15, at 19. 
38 See Investigations Manual supra note 25, at 15. 
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and preparation for the investigation.  In the investigation fact-
finding process the investigator must collect and preserve 
sources of evidence, and record witnesses’ testimonies. The fi-
nal investigation report will either determine that the matter 
must be closed or there is sufficient factual information to 
make recommendations about the reported act of misconduct.39  
The OIOS decision determining whether to close an investiga-
tion is discretionary and must take into account the interests of 
the Organization.  The investigation report will advise the Sec-
retary-General of potential fraud or possible misconduct of UN 
staff.  
Administration of Justice Oversight  
The administration of justice system provides the oversight 
for the Organization to determine whether the investigation 
was conducted in accordance with the proper procedures.  In-
vestigations of a staff member’s conduct must be conducted 
properly to respect the interests of complainants and witnesses, 
in addition to avoiding the potential for organizational liability.  
The investigation is the first part of the system of internal jus-
tice, and the resulting investigation report may be the basis of 
a charge of misconduct.40  OIOS is aware that the findings and 
results of an internal investigation report may be admitted into 
evidence before the United Nations Dispute Tribunals and Ap-
peals Tribunal, and therefore must take the proper precaution 
to ensure proper admissibility of evidence, including witness 
testimony, documents, and records.     
IV. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR DISCIPLINARY 
PROCEDURES IN THE UNITED NATIONS 
The United Nations is governed by a hierarchal regulatory 
structure.  Under the UN Charter, the UN General Assembly 
issues Regulations and Rules. UN Staff Rules are promulgated 
by the Secretary-General to enforce the Staff Regulations, and 
UN Administrative issuances, which include Administrative 
Instructions and Secretary-General Bulletins, both issued by 
the U.N. Administration and Secretary-General’s Office respec-
tively.   
                                                             
39 Id. at 16. 
40 Id. at 19. 
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The Charter of the United Nations establishes the basic 
principles for the UN.41  Based on the principles in the Charter, 
the General Assembly Resolutions provides UN Staff Regula-
tions, which set out the broad principles of human resources 
policy for staff administration within the Secretariat and the 
separately administered funds and programs.  The Secretary-
General promulgates and enforces Staff Rules, which provide 
guidance in the implementation of the Staff Regulations.  
Disciplinary measures are provided under UN Staff Regu-
lation Article X of the Staff Regulations.  In accordance with 
Article X on “Disciplinary measures,” the Secretary-General 
may impose disciplinary measures, as stated in Staff Regula-
tion 10.1:42 
(a)  “The Secretary-General may impose disciplinary measures on 
staff members who engage in misconduct;  
(b)  “Sexual exploitation and sexual abuse constitute serious mis-
conduct.”43  
Under Chapter X of the UN Staff Rules and Regulations, 
“Disciplinary measures and procedures,” Staff Rule 10.1(a) de-
fines “Misconduct,” as follows:44  
(a) Failure by a staff member to comply with his or her obliga-
tions under the Charter of the United Nations, the Staff Regula-
tions and Staff Rules or other relevant administrative issuances 
or to observe the standards of conduct expected of an interna-
tional civil servant may amount to misconduct and may lead to 
the institution of a disciplinary process and the imposition of dis-
ciplinary measures for misconduct.  
Chapter X, UN staff rule 10.1(c) states that “the decision to 
launch an investigation into allegations of misconduct, to insti-
tute a disciplinary process and to impose a disciplinary meas-
ure shall be within the discretionary authority of the Secretary-
General or officials with delegated authority.”45  The Secretary-
General has delegated his authority to launch investigations to 
                                                             
41 See generally U.N. Charter.  
42 U.N. Secretary-General, Staff Rules and Staff Regulations of the Unit-
ed Nations: Rep. of Secretary-General, Art. X, Reg. 10.1(a), U.N. Doc. 
ST/SGB/2011/1 (Jan. 1, 2011). [hereinafter “U.N. Staff Rules”].  
43 Id. at Art. X, Reg. 10.1(b). 
44Id. at Ch. X, Rule 10.1(a). 
45U.N. Staff Rules, supra note 42, at Ch. X, Rule 10.1(c). 
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OIOS.  Whether a disciplinary process is instituted to deter-
mine whether a disciplinary measure should be imposed will be 
based on the findings of an investigation.46    
The Secretary-General can only initiate disciplinary pro-
ceedings against a staff member if the findings of an investiga-
tion indicate that misconduct has occurred.  UN staff rule 10.3, 
“Due process in the disciplinary process,” states the following:47  
(a) The Secretary-General may initiate the disciplinary process 
where the findings of an investigation indicate that misconduct 
may have occurred. In such cases, no disciplinary measure or 
non-disciplinary measure, except as provided under staff rule 
10.2 (b) (iii), may be imposed on a staff member following the 
completion of an investigation unless he or she has been notified, 
in writing, of the charges against him or her, and has been given 
the opportunity to respond to those charges.  The staff member 
shall also be informed of the right to seek the assistance of coun-
sel in his or her defence through the Office of Staff Legal Assis-
tance, or from outside counsel at his or her own expense. 
During the disciplinary process, the staff member must be 
accorded due process rights. Disciplinary procedures are under-
taken in accordance with Administrative Instruction, 
ST/AI/371, Amend.1 (May 11, 2010) “Revised Disciplinary 
Measures and Procedures”.48  The Programs and Funds, such 
as UNICEF and UNDP have their own administrative instruc-
                                                             
46 Id. at Rule 10.2(a) (“Disciplinary measures.” The U.N. is limited to the 
following disciplinary measures which can be imposed upon a staff member: 
(a) Disciplinary measures may take one or more of the following forms only: 
(i) Written censure; (ii) Loss of one or more steps in grade; (iii) Deferment, 
for a specified period, of eligibility for salary increment; (iv) Suspension 
without pay for a specified period; (v) Fine; (vi) Deferment, for a specified 
period, of eligibility for consideration for promotion; (vii) Demotion with de-
ferment, for a specified period, of eligibility for consideration for promotion; 
(viii) Separation from service, with notice or compensation in lieu of notice, 
notwithstanding staff rule 9.7, and with or without termination indemnity 
pursuant to paragraph (c) of annex III to the Staff Regulations; (ix) Dismis-
sal. Non-disciplinary measures or administrative measures are as follows in 
U.N. staff rule 10.2 (b): “(b) Measures other than those listed under staff rule 
10.2 (a) shall not be considered to be disciplinary measures within the mean-
ing of the present rule. These include, but are not limited to, the following 
administrative measures: (i) Written or oral reprimand; (ii) Recovery of mon-
ies owed to the Organization; (iii) Administrative leave with or without pay 
pursuant to staff rule 10.4.”). 
47 Id. at Rule 10.3. 
48 Revised Disciplinary Measures and Procedures 2010, supra note 30.  
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tions involving disciplinary procedures.49    
UN Administrative Instruction ST/AI/371 on “Revised Dis-
ciplinary Measures and Procedures” (hereinafter referred to as 
“ST/AI/371”) was revised in light of the new administration of 
justice system in the UN.50  For the purpose of implementing 
General Assembly resolutions 61/261, 62/228 and 63/253, the 
“Revised Disciplinary Measures and Procedures,” 
ST/AI/371/Amend.1, (hereinafter referred to as 
“ST/AI/371/Amend.1”) replaced paragraphs in ST/AI/371 con-
cerning investigations.  ST/AI/371/Amend.1, was revised in 
2010, not abolished, to incorporate the new administration of 
justice system, as discussed below.  ST/AI/371/Amend.1, advis-
es staff members of the basic requirements of due process af-
forded to a staff member against whom misconduct has been 
alleged.  According to ST/AI/371/Amend. 1, “where there is rea-
son to believe that a staff member has engaged in unsatisfacto-
ry conduct for which a disciplinary measure may be imposed, 
the head of office or responsible officer shall undertake an in-
vestigation.”51  The former ST/AI/371 (2 August 1991) was 
promulgated prior to the creation of the Investigations Divi-
sion, thus it does not make any reference to OIOS as the inves-
tigative body for allegations of misconduct.  
ST/AI/371/Amend.1 defines the acts for which disciplinary 
measures may be imposed.  In paragraph 2 (replacing Para-
graph 3 of ST/AI/371),  
“(i)f the investigation results in sufficient evidence indicating 
that the staff member engaged in wrongdoing that could amount 
to misconduct, the head of office or responsible officer should 
immediately report the matter to the Assistant Secretary-
General, Office of Human Resources Management, giving a full 
account of the facts that are known and attaching documentary 
evidence, such as checks, invoices, administrative forms signed 
written statements by witnesses and any other document or rec-
                                                             
49 UNICEF, Prohibition of discrimination, harassment, sexual harass-
ment and abuse of authority, Exec. Directive, CF/EXD/2012-007 (Nov. 30, 
2012); UNDP Legal Framework for Addressing Non-Compliance with UN 
Standards of Conduct (January 2010).  
50 U.N. Secretariat, Administrative Instruction, Revised Disciplinary 
Measures and Procedures,, U.N. Doc. ST/AI/371 (Aug. 2 1991) [hereinafter 
“Revised Disciplinary Measures and Procedures 1991”].   
51 Revised Disciplinary Measures and Procedures 2010, supra note 30, at 
¶ 1. 
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ord relevant to the alleged misconduct.52  
The investigation can be undertaken by the head of de-
partment, office, designate, or by OIOS, by its own initiative or 
at the request of a head of office. According to 
ST/AI/371/Amend.1, following an investigation by OIOS or an 
ad hoc body, the head of department or office may refer the 
matter to the Assistant Secretary-General for Human Re-
sources Management to decide whether the matter should be 
pursued. The Investigations Division is mandated to transmit 
the results of the investigation to the Secretary-General with 
appropriate recommendations to guide the Secretary-General 
in deciding on the appropriate action including disciplinary or 
administrative measures, consideration of referral to national 
authorities, and requesting financial recovery.  
ST/AI/371/Amend. 1, paragraph 6, states that upon considera-
tion of the entire dossier, the Assistant Secretary-General shall 
decide whether the disciplinary case should be closed or decide 
to impose one or more non-disciplinary measures.53    
Only if a preponderance of the evidence indicates miscon-
duct, the Secretary-General can recommend the imposition of 
one or more disciplinary measures.54  The Secretary-General 
has delegated the authority to make recommendations on the 
imposition of disciplinary measures to the Under-Secretary-
General for Management.55  
At this point, it is necessary to address the issue of work-
place sexual harassment and abuse of authority.  The Secre-
tary-General promulgated Secretary-General’s Bulletin “Prohi-
bition of discrimination, harassment, including sexual 
harassment, and abuse of authority,” ST/SGB/2008/5, dated 
February 11, 2008, wherein informal and formal procedures 
were established to assist aggrieved individuals who feel that 
they have been sexually harassed in the UN workplace.56  At 
the discretion of OIOS, issues of sexual harassment may be in-
                                                             
52 Id. at ¶ 2. 
53 Id. at ¶ 6. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 U.N. Secretary-General, Bulletin, Prohibition of discrimination, har-
assment, including sexual harassment, and abuse of authority, U.N. Doc. 
ST/SGB/2008/5 (Feb.11, 2008). 
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vestigated by another investigation entity.57  The appointed 
panel consists of at least two individuals who have been 
trained in investigating allegations of prohibited conduct; the 
objective of the panel is to conduct a fact-finding investigation 
and produce a written report with documentary evidence.  If 
the report indicates that there was a factual basis for the alle-
gations, such allegations were well-founded, and the conduct 
amounts to alleged misconduct, the responsible official shall re-
fer the matter to the Assistant Secretary-General for Human 
Resources Management for disciplinary action.    
The investigation of sexual harassment allegations must 
be distinguished from the investigation of sexual exploitation 
and abuse (SEA) allegations.  The Investigation Division con-
ducts investigations of sexual exploitation and abuse allega-
tions, in particular, allegations raised by complainants in UN 
peace-keeping missions in accordance with the 
ST/SGB/2003/13, “Prohibition of Sexual Exploitation and 
Abuse.”58  The Investigation Division, may not be the first re-
sponder involved in the fact-finding process of sexual harass-
ment allegations in the UN workplace.  The UN Secretariat 
has created the Conduct and Discipline Units in the Depart-
ment of Field Services, to conduct fact-finding in sexual exploi-
tation and abuse cases.  
The above shows the regulatory framework for the investi-
gation and disciplinary process in the United Nations.  The 
United Nations Dispute Tribunals and the United Nations Ap-
peals Tribunal provide the judicial process for ensuring that 
the basic standards of due process are observed during the in-
vestigation and disciplinary process.  
This next portion of this article will focus on judgments of 
the United Nations Dispute Tribunals and the United Nations 
Appeals Tribunal.  The United Nations Dispute Tribunals, lo-
cated in New York, Geneva, and Nairobi, determine the factual 
issues of the cases.  The United Nations Appeals Tribunal ren-
ders final judgment on an appeal filed against a judgment ren-
dered by the Dispute Tribunal. 
                                                             
57 Id. at sec. 5.14. 
58 U.N. Secretary-General, Bulletin, Prohibition of Sexual Exploitation 
and Abuse, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/2003/13 (Oct. 9 2003). 
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V. THE UNITED NATIONS ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE SYSTEM 
In 2007, the UN General Assembly established the new, 
independent, transparent, professionalized, adequately re-
sourced and decentralized system of administration of justice 
in the United Nations in resolution A/61/261 of Apr. 30, 2007.59   
As stated in the resolution, “the new judicial system would be 
consistent with the relevant rules of international law and the 
principles of the rule of law and due process to ensure the 
rights and obligation of staff members and the accountability of 
managers and staff members.”60  The General Assembly agreed  
the formal system of administration of justice should be com-
prised of two tiers, consisting of a first instance, the United Na-
tions Dispute Tribunal (hereinafter “Dispute Tribunal”), and 
an appellate instance, the United Nations Appeals Tribunal 
(hereinafter “Appeals Tribunal”), which would render binding 
decisions and order appropriate remedies.  
The General Assembly reaffirmed its decision to establish 
a new and independent system of administration of justice in 
its resolution A/62/228 on Feb. 6, 2008.61  The General Assem-
bly decided that the two-tier formal system of administration of 
justice comprising of the Dispute Tribunal and the Appeals 
Tribunal would commence as of Jan. 1, 2009.  The judges of 
both tribunals would be appointed by the General Assembly, 
based on the recommendations of the Internal Justice Council, 
a panel of independent experts established to ensure independ-
ence and professionalism in the selection of candidates for the 
vacancy of both Tribunals.   
A. The United Nations Dispute Tribunal 
The UN Dispute Tribunal was created as the first instance 
of the two tier formal system of the administration of justice in 
the United Nations.  The Dispute Tribunal has the competence 
to hear and pass judgments on applications filed by individuals 
against the Secretary-General of the United Nations as the 
                                                             
59 G.A. Res. 61/261, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp.49, U.N. Doc. A/61/49 
(Apr. 30, 2007). 
60 Id. at para. 4.   
61 G.A. Res. 62/228, U.N. GAOR, 62nd Sess., Supp.49, at 458, U.N. Doc. 
A/62/49 (Feb. 6, 2007).  
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Chief Administrative Officer of the United Nations.62  The 
Dispute Tribunal also has the competence to hear and pass 
judgment on the application filed against a specialized agency 
with the United Nations or other agency where a special 
agreement has been concluded between the agency and the UN 
Secretariat.  
According to the Statute, the Dispute Tribunal shall be 
composed of three full-time judges and two half-time judges. 
The Dispute Tribunal can order one or both of the following 
remedies:63  
(a) Rescission of the contested administrative decision or 
specific performance, provided that, where the contested ad-
ministrative decision concerns appointment, promotion or ter-
mination, the Dispute Tribunal shall also set an amount of 
compensation that the respondent may elect to pay as an alter-
native to the rescission of the contested administrative decision 
or specific performance ordered, subject to subparagraph (b) of 
the present paragraph;   
(b) Compensation, which shall normally not exceed the 
equivalent of two years’ net base salary of the applicant. The 
Dispute Tribunal may, however, in exceptional cases order the 
payment of a higher compensation and shall provide the rea-
sons for that decision. 
The Dispute Tribunal is competent to hear and pass judg-
ment on an appeal of an administrative decision imposing dis-
ciplinary measure.64  Under UN staff rule 10.3 (b), “Due process 
in the disciplinary process,” a staff member against whom dis-
ciplinary or non-disciplinary measures, have been imposed fol-
lowing the completion of a disciplinary process may submit an 
application challenging the imposition of such measure directly 
to the Dispute Tribunal, in accordance with Chapter XI of the 
Staff Rules.”65  Under staff rule 11.2 “Management evaluation,” 
a UN staff member is required, as a first step, to submit to the 
Secretary-General a request for a management evaluation of 
the administrative decision.” A management evaluation is the 
opportunity for the UN management to reassess the decision 
                                                             
62 G.A. Res. 63/253, U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., U.N. Doc A/RES/63/253 (Dec. 
24, 2008) (adopting the Statute of the United Nations Dispute Tribunal).  
63 Id. at art. 10. 
64 Id. at art. 2.  
65 U.N. Staff Rules, supra note 42, at Rule 10.3(c).  
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taken by a manager to determine whether the decision was 
taken in accordance with the UN Staff Regulations and Rules 
and UN policies.    
Under staff rule 11.2(b) “a staff member wishing to formal-
ly contest an administrative decision taken pursuant to a deci-
sion taken at Headquarters in New York to impose a discipli-
nary or non-disciplinary measure pursuant to staff rule 10.2 
following the completion of a disciplinary process is not re-
quired to request a management evaluation.”  The Dispute Tri-
bunal has jurisdiction over applications filed by staff member 
to appeal an administrative decision imposing a disciplinary 
measure.66  A staff member may file directly to the UN Dispute 
Tribunal without submitting a request for management evalu-
ation.  This process only involves a disciplinary measure deci-
sion of (i) written censure; (ii) loss of one or more steps in 
grade; (iii) deferment, for a specified period, of eligibility for 
salary increment; (iv) suspension without pay for a specified 
period; (v) fine; (vi) deferment, for a specified period, of eligibil-
ity for consideration for promotion; (vii) demotion with defer-
ment, for a specified period, of eligibility for considerate for 
promotion; (viii) separation from service, with notice or com-
pensation in lieu of notice, ; and (ix) dismissal.  A UN adminis-
trative decision on the imposition of a disciplinary measure is 
the only decision, which can bypass the management evalua-
tion requirement.  All other decisions, including administrative 
decisions regarding investigations, must be submitted to a 
management evaluation.  After the response from management 
on the request for management evaluation, the staff member 
has the right to submit an application can be submitted to the 
Dispute Tribunal.  
B. The United Nations Appeals Tribunal  
The General Assembly adopted the Statute of the UN Ap-
peals Tribunal in General Assembly resolution 63/253 on Feb. 
23, 2009.67  The Statute established the Appeals Tribunal as 
the second instance of the new two-tier formal system of ad-
ministration of justice.  The General Assembly confirmed that 
the Appeals Tribunal should not have any powers beyond those 
                                                             
66 Id. Rule 11.4; G.A. Res. 63/253, supra note 62, at art. 2, ¶ 1. 
67 U.N. Staff Rules at Rule 11.4; G.A. Res. 63/253, supra note 62. 
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conferred under its Statutes.   Article. 2 (1) of the Statute 
states the limited competence of the Appeals Tribunal to hear 
and pass judgment on an appeal filed against a judgment ren-
dered by the Dispute Tribunal when it is asserted that the Dis-
pute Tribunal has:68  
(a) Exceeded its jurisdiction or competence;  
(b) Failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it;  
(c) Erred on a question of law;  
(d) Committed an error in procedure, such as to affect the deci-
sion of the case; or  
(e) Erred on a question of fact, resulting in a manifestly unrea-
sonable decision.  
The Appeals Tribunal established its own Rules of Proce-
dure, which are subject to approval by the General Assembly.  
In General Assembly resolution 64/119 on Jan. 15, 2010, the 
General Assembly approved the Rules of Procedure for the Ap-
peals Tribunal.69  
One of the notable changes in the creation of the Appeals 
Tribunal is the provision that an appeal may be filed by either 
party against the judgment of the Dispute Tribunal.  Previous-
ly under the former UN Administrative Tribunal, only the staff 
member could file an appeal to the Tribunal.  The Appeals Tri-
bunal has the competence:70 
(a) To affirm, reverse or modify findings of fact of the Dispute 
Tribunal on the basis of substantial evidence in the written rec-
ord; or  
(b) To remand the case to the Dispute Tribunal for additional 
findings of fact… 
 The Appeals Tribunal is composed of seven judges ap-
pointed by the General Assembly.  The UN Appeals Tribunal 
may order as a remedy the following:71 
(a) Rescission of the contested administrative decision or specific 
                                                             
68 G.A. Res. 63/253, supra note 62, at art. 2, ¶¶ 1(a)-(d).   
69 G.A Res. 64/119, U.N. GAOR, 64th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/119 (Jan. 
15, 2010) (adopting G.A. Res. 63/253 and the statutes of the U.N. Dispute 
Tribunal and the U.N. Appeals Tribunal).  
70 G.A. Res. 63/253, supra note 62 at Annex II, art. 2, ¶¶4(a)-(b).  
71 Id. at art. 9, ¶¶ 1(a)-(b). 
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performance, provided that, where the contested administrative 
decision concerns appointment, promotion or termination, the 
Appeals Tribunal shall also set an amount of compensation that 
the respondent may elect to pay as an alternative to the rescis-
sion of the contested administrative decision or specific perfor-
mance ordered, subject to subparagraph (b) of the present para-
graph;   
(b) Compensation, which shall normally not exceed the equiva-
lent of two years’ net base salary of the applicant.  The Appeals 
Tribunal may, however, in exceptional cases order the payment 
of a higher compensation and shall provide the reasons for that 
decision. 
The judgments of the Appeals Tribunal are final and with-
out appeal. The judgments are binding upon both parties.72 
VI. THE UNITED NATIONS DISPUTE TRIBUNALS AND THE UNITED 
NATIONS APPEALS TRIBUNALS JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE UN 
DISCIPLINARY FRAMEWORK, ST/AI/371/AMEND.1 (MAY 11, 2010)  
The Appeals Tribunal and the Dispute Tribunal have made 
numerous rulings in the area of investigation procedures and 
the rights of UN staff members in the area of investigations 
and disciplinary cases.  Since this article focuses on the inves-
tigations and judicial review, I will address these issues raised 
before the UN Tribunals.   
The Dispute Tribunal and the Appeals Tribunal, both created 
in July 2009, considered cases which were carried over from 
the former administration of justice system.  These cases were 
not heard by the former UN Administrative Tribunal and car-
ried over to the Dispute Tribunal for oral hearings.  Therefore, 
the UN judicial tribunals considered cases under the revised 
disciplinary framework, ST/AI/371/Amend.1 (May 11, 2010), 
and the former Administrative Instruction, ST/AI/371 (Aug. 2, 
1991).  In the initial disciplinary cases considered by the UN 
judicial tribunals, the disciplinary decisions were taken in ac-
cordance with the former Administrative Instruction, 
ST/AI/371.  The discussion of the cases below will refer to 
whether the decision was taken in accordance with 
ST/AI/371/Amend.1 (May 11, 2010), or the former Administra-
tive Instruction, ST/AI/371 (Aug. 2, 1991).  
                                                             
72 Id. at art. 10, ¶¶ 5-6. 
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A. Is there “reason to believe” that a staff member has engaged 
in unsatisfactory misconduct to initiate an investigation?  
The framework for initiation of disciplinary proceedings 
commences with the revised UN Administrative Instruction, 
ST/AI/371/Amend.1.73 ST/AI/371/Amend.1, states the following 
as the first step in the investigation process: “II. Investigation 
and fact-finding  
2. Where there is reason to believe that a staff member has 
engaged in an unsatisfactory conduct for which a disciplinary 
measure may be imposed, the head of office or responsible of-
ficer shall undertake an investigation.” 
 Based on the above framework, the first step in the in-
vestigation process is to determine whether there is “reason to 
believe” that the staff member engaged in unsatisfactory con-
duct.  This condition is required in both ST/AI/371/Amend.1, 
and the former Administrative Instruction, ST/AI/371.  If there 
is a reason to believe that the staff member has engaged in un-
satisfactory misconduct, then the Organization must undertake 
an investigation.  
A significant difference between the former Administrative 
Instruction, ST/AI/371, and the revised UN Administrative In-
struction is that former Administrative Instruction ST/AI/371 
requires the head of office or responsible officer to undertake a 
“preliminary investigation.”  The revised Administrative In-
struction, ST/AI/371/Amend.1, eliminated “preliminary investi-
gation” and replaced it with “investigation” which would be un-
dertaken by the head of office or responsible officer.  The 
deletion of the word “preliminary” reinforces the principle that 
if there is reason to believe that a staff member has engaged in 
unsatisfactory conduct, the Organization must conduct an in-
vestigation.  This has been upheld by the tribunals.  
As stated in UN Information Circular ST/IC/2013/29, “de-
pending on the subject matter and the complexity of the report 
of misconduct, the investigation can be undertaken by the head 
of office or his designees, or by the OIOS, at its own initiative 
or at the request of a head of office.”74  
                                                             
73 Revised Disciplinary Measures and Procedures 2010, supra note 30. 
74 U.N. Secretariat, Information Circular, Practice of the Secretary-
General in Disciplinary Matters and Cases of Criminal Behaviour, 1 July. 
2012-30 June 2013, § 1(C), ¶ 6 , U.N. Doc. ST/IC/2013/29 (Sept. 18, 2013).  
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In Abboud v. the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
the Appeals Tribunal held that the former Administrative In-
struction, ST/AI/371, created the obligation to undertake an in-
vestigation into acts or behavior that would discredit the Or-
ganization.75   According to the Dispute Tribunal, the 
Organization must conduct an official investigation; this proce-
dure is not optional or discretionary.  In Abboud, the Appellant 
sought an order to compel the Administration to undertake a 
preliminary investigation into the allegedly inappropriate be-
havior of one of the panel members during the Appellant’s in-
terview for a P-5 position.   
The Appeals Tribunal determined that the Organization 
has the obligation to undertake an investigation in cases of 
“[a]cts or behavior[u]r that would discredit the United Na-
tions.”76  In the instant case, the Appeals Tribunal upheld the 
lower Tribunal’s finding that “that the circumstances of the al-
legation of unsatisfactory conduct in the present case created 
the obligation to initiate a preliminary investigation, which the 
USG/DGACM failed to conduct.”77  The Appeals Tribunal de-
cided that the obligation to initiate a preliminary investigation 
is not discretionary if the staff member acts or behaves in a 
manner that would discredit the UN; under these circumstanc-
es, the Organization must initiate a preliminary investigation.    
In Marshall v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, the 
Appeals Tribunal considered whether the Dispute Tribunal 
erred in law and fact in its findings that the initiation of a pre-
liminary investigation was met.78  In Marshall, the Appellant 
had a relationship with the Complainant, also a staff member 
with the Organization and the Appellant’s supervisee.  On Au-
gust 15, 2005 the Complainant wrote a memorandum to the 
Chief, Personnel Section, UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea 
(UNMEE), stating that she had been subject to verbal and 
physical assault by the Appellant.    
The UN Appeals Tribunal inquired what would be the Or-
                                                             
75 Abboud v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judgments U.N. 
Appeals Trib., No. 2010-UNAT-100 (Dec. 29, 2010).  
76 Revised Disciplinary Measures and Procedures 1991, supra note 50, at 
II, ¶ (2)(g). 
77 See Abboud, supra note 75, at ¶ 45. 
78 Marshall v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judgments U.N. 
Appeals Trib., No. 2012-UNAT-270 (Nov. 1, 2012).  
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ganization’s obligation towards the Complainant upon receipt 
of an allegation of physical and verbal abuse.  The allegations 
in the Complainant’s letter were serious allegations by one 
staff member against another staff member, which put the 
Complainant in fear of her safety.    
For the Organization to embark on a preliminary fact-
finding investigation into the claims about the Applicant’s con-
duct, the Organization is required to have “reason to believe 
that a staff member has engaged in unsatisfactory conduct of 
which a disciplinary measure may be imposed.”79  In order to 
determine whether there was “reason to believe” that the staff 
member has engaged in unsatisfactory conduct, the Organiza-
tion must review the facts of the case in light of the statutory 
prerequisites for “unsatisfactory conduct” as set out in former 
Administrative Instruction, ST/AI/371:80  
(a) Acts or omissions in conflict with the general obligations of 
staff members set forth in article 1 of the Staff Regulations and 
the rules and instructions implementing it;   
(b) Unlawful acts (e.g. theft, fraud, possession or sale of illegal 
substances, smuggling) on or off United Nations premises, and 
whether or not the staff member was officially on duty at the 
time;   
(c) Misrepresentation or false certification in connection with any 
United Nations claim or benefit, including failure to disclose a 
fact material to that claim or benefit;   
(d) Assault upon, harassment of, or threats to other staff mem-
bers;   
(e) Misuse of United Nations equipment or files, including elec-
tronic files;   
(f) Misuse of office; abuse of authority; breach of confidentiality; 
abuse of United Nations privileges and immunities,   
(g) Acts or behavior[u]r that would discredit the United Nations.  
The Organization must initiate a fact-finding investigation 
to determine if the staff member has engaged in any of the 
above statutory prerequisites which would constitute unsatis-
factory conduct after an investigation has been conducted.  The 
                                                             
79 Id. (Marshall was decided under the former ST/AI/371.). 
80 Revised Disciplinary Measures and Procedures 1991, supra note 50, at 
II, ¶ ¶  (2)(a-g). 
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Appeals Tribunal noted the Dispute Tribunal’s reasoning that 
the practical guidelines for all staff members, bodies, and pan-
els whose responsibility it is to conduct preliminary fact-finding 
investigations are contained in the OIOS Manual of Investiga-
tion Practices and Policies of 2005. Paragraph 55 provides:81  
The fundamental requirement of fairness during a fact finding 
investigation is that the investigator has to approach the matter with 
an open mind.  An investigator who has formed a concluded opinion 
on the matter prior to the start of an investigation must not under-
take the investigation.  Of course, an investigator may be suspicious 
and those suspicions may strengthen or lessen during the investiga-
tion.  However, the task of the investigator is to establish facts and 
draw reasonable conclusions from those facts. It is a dispassionate 
professional exercise.  Allegations from an informant or Program [me] 
Manager are simply allegations.  The investigator will attempt to as-
certain the facts by interviewing witnesses, by seeking documentary 
or other evidence, such as expert opinions or site visits on the basis of 
which ID/OlOS will make its recommendations to the Program [me] 
Manager. 
The Appeals Tribunal and the Dispute Tribunal relied up-
on the standards established in the OIOS Investigation Manual 
to determine that during the investigation stage, the investiga-
tor will ascertain the facts through witness interviews, docu-
mentary or other evidence, and expert opinions or site visits.  
On the basis of the findings and conclusions of the OIOS inves-
tigation as contained in the final Investigation report, the head 
of office or responsible officer can determine whether there is 
“reason to believe” that the staff member engaged in unsatis-
factory conduct.   
B.  Head of office or responsible officer review of the findings 
and recommendation in the investigation report.  
Upon completion of the investigation report, the Investiga-
tion Division, OIOS, has concluded the fact-finding process.  
The OIOS Investigation Report is submitted to the head of of-
fice or responsible officer for review in accordance with 
ST/AI/371/Amend.1, paragraph 3,82 [i]f the investigation results 
                                                             
81 Marshall, supra note 78, at ¶ 53. 
82 Revised Disciplinary Measures and Procedures 1991, supra note 50, at 
II, ¶ 3 (U.N. Doc. ST/AI/371 (Aug. 2, 1991), states “If the preliminary investi-
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in sufficient evidence indicating that the staff member en-
gaged in wrongdoing that could amount to misconduct, the 
head of office or responsible officer should immediately report 
the matter to the Assistant Secretary-General, Office of Human 
Resources Management . . .”83 
According to ST/AI/371/Amend.1, the Head of Office must 
present to the ASG, OHRM, a “full account of the facts that are 
known and attaching documentary evidence, such as cheques, 
invoices, administrative forms, signed written statements by 
witnesses and any other document or record relevant to the al-
leged misconduct.”  These are the documentary evidence con-
tained in the OIOS Investigation Report to support the fact 
findings and recommendations.  
What is ‘sufficient evidence’ for the Head of Office to report 
the matter to the Assistant Secretary-General, Office of Human 
Resources Management?  
The difference between ST/AI/371/Amend.1, paragraph 3, 
and the former Administrative Instruction ST/AI/371, para-
graph 3, is that ST/AI/371/Amend.1, paragraph 3, establishes a 
higher standard for the Head of Office to make a determination 
that the staff member has engaged in misconduct.  In 
ST/AI/371/Amend.1, the Head of Office must determine wheth-
er there is “sufficient evidence” that the staff member’s actions 
amounted to misconduct.  The former Administrative Instruc-
tion ST/AI/371, paragraph 3, refers to whether the preliminary 
investigation indicated that the report of misconduct is “well 
founded” for the Head of Office to report it to the ASG/OHRM.  
In one of the first cases decided by the Dispute Tribunal, 
Lutta v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Dispute 
Tribunal reviewed the procedures for initiating an investiga-
tion for the purposes of disciplinary proceedings as set out in 
the former Administrative Instruction ST/AI/371.84  The issue 
in Lutta concerned a staff member who was involved in a traffic 
                                                                                                                                        
gation appears to indicate that the report of misconduct is well founded, the 
head of office or responsible officer should immediately report the matter to 
the Assistant Secretary-General, Office of Human Resources Management . . 
.”).  
83 Revised Disciplinary Measures and Procedures 2010, supra note 30, at 
¶ 2. 
84 Lutta v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judgments U.N. 
Dispute Trib., No. UNDT/2010/052 (Mar. 31, 2010) (not appealed).  
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accident in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire while driving an official UN 
vehicle.85   It was alleged that the staff member was driving 
under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident.  The 
United Nations Operations in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) Special 
Investigation Unit (SIU) conducted the and submitted an in-
vestigation report.  
The Dispute Tribunal held that the facts in Lutta showed 
that at the investigation stage, the evidence that was relied on 
to establish that the Applicant was driving under the influence 
of intoxicating liquor was not based on scientific examination 
but emanated from the impression formed by investigators who 
saw the Applicant immediately after the accident.  The Dispute 
Tribunal determined that based on the evidence gathered in 
the course of the investigation, which consisted of the state-
ments of the SIU Officers and the damage to the two vehicles, 
the Director, Division of Field Services (DFS), recommended 
that disciplinary proceedings be initiated against the Appli-
cant.  The ASG, OHRM, filed charges of misconduct against the 
Applicant based on the facts presented by the Director, DFS.  
Lutta makes a distinction between the standard in a crim-
inal matter, which requires a prima facie case that there is 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause that a suspect has 
committed an offense.  The Dispute Tribunal relied upon the 
European Court of Human Rights that “having reasonable sus-
picion presupposes the existence of facts or information which 
would satisfy an objective observer that the person concerned 
may have committed the offence.”  The Head of Office must de-
cide whether the evidence in the investigation report indicates 
that the report of misconduct is well founded for submission to 
the ASG, OHRM.  Lutta noted that the report of misconduct 
has to be reviewed by the Head of Office, yet it is up to the 
ASG, OHRM, to decide whether the matter should be pursued 
for a formal disciplinary action.    
The Tribunal found in Lutta that the SIU investigation did 
not meet any of the well-recognized international norms of 
fairness in investigations and that the disciplinary measures 
imposed on the Applicant, based on the evidence from the in-
vestigation, was therefore unjustified and disproportionate.  
The Tribunal held that “the SIU investigators concluded, from 
                                                             
85 Id. 
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what appears to be their subjective observations, that the Ap-
plicant was indeed intoxicated at the time of the accident.  As 
the Applicant was under shock and was diabetic, it would have 
been appropriate to test his behavior in the light of that health 
condition.”86   
The Dispute Tribunal held that on the evidence available, 
it was wrong for the responsible officer to have recommended 
further action against the Applicant.  The Tribunal concluded 
that at the investigation stage the standard of proof required to 
establish a charge is not as high as that of the beyond reasona-
ble doubt standard obtaining in criminal matters.  
In the Dispute Tribunal’s decision of Gambari v. the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations, the Applicant, a Personal 
Assistant at the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(UNMIBH), was charged with having made threats against an-
other staff member and having improperly used UN infor-
mation and communication technology for this purpose.87   On  
Dec. 28, 2005, an envelope containing a letter threatening the 
life of an UNMIL staff member was received at OIOS in New 
York.  An OIOS investigation was initiated to inquire as to the 
origin of the letter and an OIOS Investigation Report was is-
sued on May 31, 2007.  Based on the findings in the OIOS In-
vestigation Report, the Head of Office reported the matter to 
the ASG and OHRM.  The Applicant was charged in discipli-
nary proceedings as the author of the letter. She contended 
that the charges were based on an investigation that was not 
thoroughly or properly carried out and as a consequence erro-
neous conclusions were drawn from the facts.  In Gambari, the 
Dispute Tribunal considered the following questions under 
former Administrative Instruction ST/AI/371:88was there rea-
son to believe that the Applicant had engaged in unsatisfactory 
conduct for which a disciplinary measure may be imposed and 
did the preliminary investigation appear to indicate that the 
report of misconduct against the Applicant was well founded?  
In Gambari, the Dispute Tribunal noted, in reference to 
Lutta v. the Secretary-General of the United Nations, that hav-
                                                             
86 Id. at ¶ 7.3.3. 
87 Gambari v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judgments U.N. 
Dispute Trib., No. UNDT/2012/193 (Dec. 6, 2012) (not appealed). 
88 Id. at ¶¶ 46(a-b).  
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ing reasonable suspicion presupposes the existence of facts or 
information which would satisfy an objective observer that the 
person concerned may have committed the offence.89   The Dis-
pute Tribunal held in Gambari that the same approach should 
be adopted in the exercise of the discretion given to the Head of 
Office in determining whether the report of misconduct is well 
founded following the investigation.  The Dispute Tribunal not-
ed that the discretion of the Head of Office cannot and should 
not be used capriciously in order to scrutinize the evidence 
carefully before deciding whether any act of misconduct has 
been committed.  The Dispute Tribunal held that a judicious 
exercise of this discretion by the Head of Office requires a 
proper analysis to indicate that the report of misconduct is well 
founded in regard to the evidence.  
The Dispute Tribunal decided in Gambari that the OIOS 
investigation report had established that the Applicant had 
been in communication with a person she referred to as “Chad” 
who, according to her, expressed an intention to threaten and 
harm another staff member (“FC”).  After reviewing the entire 
dossier, by a memorandum dated June 21, 2007, the Head of 
Office who was the then Director of the Department of Field 
Support, referred the case to the OHRM for appropriate action.  
The Director of the Division of Organizational Development be-
lieved that the allegations were well founded and charged the 
Applicant with acts of misconduct.  
The Dispute Tribunal found that the Administration, hav-
ing reviewed the OIOS report, had reason to believe that the 
Applicant may have engaged in unsatisfactory conduct for 
which disciplinary measures may be imposed.  Also, forensic 
examination of the Applicant’s computer and her own admis-
sion to investigators showed that she had access to the threat 
letter which had been written by the said “Chad” against FC.  
The Tribunal accordingly held that discretion was exercised ju-
diciously by the responsible officers after review of the OIOS 
Investigation Report.  
If the Head of Office or responsible officer concludes that 
there is ‘sufficient evidence’ (under ST/371/Amend.1) which 
could amount to misconduct, he or she must report the matter 
                                                             
89 Lutta, supra note 84. 
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to the ASG,OHRM. 
C.  The decision of the Assistant Secretary-General, Office of 
Human Resources, to recommend imposition of disciplinary 
measure.  
When the Assistant Secretary-General, Office of Human 
Resources (ASG, OHRM) receives the referral by the Head of 
Office and the investigation report, it is for him or her to decide 
whether the matter should be pursued as a disciplinary case.  
In disciplinary matters, the ASG, OHRM, must decide whether 
there is sufficient evidence to determine whether the staff 
member has engaged in unsatisfactory conduct.    
In accordance with ST/AI/371/Amend.1., paragraph 9:  
9. Upon consideration of the entire dossier, the Assistant Secre-
tary-General,  
Office of Human Resources Management, on behalf of the Secre-
tary-General shall proceed as follows:  
(a) Decide that the disciplinary case should be closed, and imme-
diately inform the staff member that the charges have been 
dropped and that no disciplinary action will be taken. The Assis-
tant Secretary-General may, however, decide to impose one or 
more of the non-disciplinary measures indicated in staff rule 10.2 
(b)(i) and (ii), where appropriate; or  
(b) Should the preponderance of the evidence indicate that mis-
conduct has occurred, recommend the imposition of one or more 
disciplinary measures.  
As stated in Lutta:  
when the ASG/OHRM receives the report, it is for him/her to de-
cide whether the matter should be pursued on the basis of the ev-
idence presented.  The ASG/OHRM is also vested with a discre-
tion that should be exercised judiciously.  He/she cannot be seen 
rubber stamping the decision of the head of office or responsible 
officer.90 
In Gambari, the Dispute Tribunal considered the issue 
whether the ASG, OHRM scrutinized the evidence carefully be-
fore deciding upon whether any act of misconduct had been 
committed.  The Applicant contended that the reliance by the 
                                                             
90 Id. at ¶ 45. 
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Administration upon the findings of the OIOS investigation 
was not a proper exercise of discretion and had denied her due 
process.  The Dispute Tribunal reviewed the case and was sat-
isfied that the findings of the ASG, OHRM, were those of an ob-
jective observer who had scrutinized the entire dossier and 
made conclusions on the basis of the evidence before him.  The 
Tribunal concluded that there was no procedural irregularity 
on the part of the Organization and there was full compliance 
with former Administrative Instruction ST/AI/371.   
The Dispute Tribunal further noted in Gambari that when 
the ASG, OHRM, receives the report, it is for him or her to de-
cide whether the matter should be pursued on the basis of the 
evidence presented.  The Dispute Tribunal upheld the decision 
made by the ASG, OHRM to commence disciplinary proceed-
ings against the Applicant after reviewing the findings against 
the Applicant contained in the OIOS Investigation Report.  The 
ASG, OHRM must scrutinize the entire Investigation Report 
and make conclusions based on the evidence in compliance 
with ST/AI/371.  When the ASG, OHRM, decides to pursue the 
matter as a disciplinary case, a Charge Letter is issued to the 
staff member.  At this stage in the process, the staff member is 
accorded due process rights.   
VII.  RIGHTS OF A STAFF MEMBER DURING THE INVESTIGATION 
PROCESS 
A. The Staff Member has limited Due Process Rights during the 
Investigation 
The Appeals Tribunal has held that during the investiga-
tions stage, only limited due process rights apply.  Due process 
rights are provided in Staff Rule 10.4 and ST/AI/371/ Amend.1.  
These provisions only apply in their entirety upon initiation of 
disciplinary proceedings.  These proceedings are brought by 
various groups including the Investigations Section, OIOS, 
other ad hoc investigatory bodies, such as a Board of Inquiry 
and SEA investigations. Due process rights attach only after 
the initiation of formal disciplinary proceedings in accordance 
with ST/AI/371/ Amend.1.    
In Powell v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, the 
Applicant joined the then United Nations Organization Mission 
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in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) on January 
25, 2002 as a Movement Control Assistant at the FS-5 level, 
and in January 2004, he was appointed Officer-in-Charge in 
Kisangani.91  On November 22, 2004 the MONUC Special Rep-
resentative of the Secretary-General convened a Board of In-
quiry (BOI) in order to investigate and report on serious allega-
tions of misconduct by the Appellant in Kisangani in March 
2004.  The BOI investigated four incidents of alleged miscon-
duct and considered ten other incidents.  The BOI concluded 
that the Appellant should be held accountable for serious mis-
conduct in fourteen incidents of alleged misconduct, which in-
cluded sexual exploitation of a casual worker.    
The allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) in 
the BOI report were submitted to a MONUC SEA Investigation 
Team.  The SEA Investigation Team conducted its investiga-
tion in February 2005 and found that the Appellant had a sex-
ual relationship with a daily casual worker.  The allegations of 
misconduct and the allegation of violation of SEA were submit-
ted to a Joint Disciplinary Committee (JDC).  The JDC recom-
mended that the relationship between the Appellant and the 
daily casual worker did not amount to SEA but the preponder-
ance of the evidence suggested that the staff member had en-
gaged in a sexual relationship.  
The Appeals Tribunal considered the due process rights of 
the Appellant under Staff Rule 110.4 and former Administra-
tive Instruction ST/AI/371.  The Tribunal determined that the 
due process rights provided in former Staff Rule 110.4 and 
former Administrative Instruction ST/AI/371 cannot apply dur-
ing the preliminary investigation because they would hinder it.  
These provisions only apply in their entirety once disciplinary 
proceedings have been initiated.92  
 24. During the preliminary investigation stage, only lim-
ited due process rights apply (emphasis added).  In the pre-
sent case, the UNDT was correct in finding that there was no 
breach of Mr. Powell’s due process rights at the preliminary in-
vestigation stage in that, on December 21, 2004, Mr. Powell had 
been apprised of the allegations against him and had been given 
                                                             
91 Powell v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judgments U.N. 
Dispute Trib., No. UNDT/2012/039 (Mar. 28, 2013). 
92 Applicant v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judgments U.N. 
App. Trib., No. 2012-UNAT-209, at ¶ 43,  (Mar. 16, 2012). 
38http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss2/2
TAMARA SHOCKLEY (DO NOT DELETE) 7/14/2015  4:40 PM 
 
2015]      INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES OF THE UN    507 
 
 
the opportunity to respond. 
25. However, the UNDT then fell into error in finding that the 
BOI and SEA investigations were final investigations.  The BOI, 
after completing its investigation, delivered its report on January 
13, 2005.  The SEA report, after completion of the investigation, 
was delivered on February 26, 2005. Mr. Powell was not charged 
with four instances of alleged misconduct until March 28, 2005.  
The two investigations therefore preceded the bringing of disci-
plinary charges, and were thus preliminary investigations. 
The Appeals Tribunal found that the Dispute Tribunal 
manifestly erred in fact and in law by finding the investiga-
tions conducted by the BOI and SEA Investigation Team were 
final investigations, which would lead to due process rights for 
the staff member.  Due process rights attach only after the ini-
tiation of formal disciplinary proceedings under former Admin-
istrative Instruction ST/AI/371.   
B. Can a staff member compel OIOS to undertake an 
investigation?  
In Abboud v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, a 
staff member was interviewed for a P-5 position in the De-
partment of General Assembly and Conference Management 
(DGACM).93  Mr. Abboud complained that one of the panel 
members had behaved inappropriately and requested an inves-
tigation into the staff member’s conduct.  He informed the Un-
der Secretary-General, Department for General Assembly and 
Conference Management (DGACM) that no action had been 
taken on his complaint.  Mr. Abboud was informed that the 
Under Secretary-General, DGACM, had decided not to under-
take a preliminary investigation.  In response, Mr. Abboud 
filed an administrative review of the decision not to undertake 
a preliminary investigation.  Dispute Tribunal determined that 
the decision of the Under Secretary-General and the DGACM 
not to order an investigation “followed a seriously inadequate 
initial inquiry, was tainted by personal pique” and rescinded 
the decision of the Under Secretary-General, DGACM 
 The Appeals Tribunal held on appeal that ST/AI/371, both 
the former and the amended version, establish the obligation to 
                                                             
93 Abboud, supra note 75. 
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undertake an investigation in cases of “[a]cts or behave[u]r that 
would discredit the United Nations” (II.2. (g) of the amended 
version and 2. (g) of the prior version).   
 The Appeals Tribunal noted that as a general principle, 
the instigation of disciplinary charges against a staff member 
is the privilege of the Organization.  It is not legally possible to 
compel the Administration to take disciplinary action.  The Ap-
peals Tribunal referred to ST/AI/371, both the former and the 
amended version, that establishes the obligation to undertake 
an investigation in cases of “(a)cts or behavior that would dis-
credit the United Nations.”94  The Appeals Tribunal also re-
ferred to the “Prohibition of discrimination, harassment, in-
cluding sexual harassment, and abuse of authority,” 
ST/SGB/2008/5, paragraph 2.1, which provides that “the Or-
ganization has the duty to take all appropriate measures to-
wards ensuring a harmonious work environment, and to pro-
tect its staff from exposure to any form of prohibited conduct”.  
The Appeals Tribunal decided that the circumstances of the al-
legation of unsatisfactory conduct created the obligation to ini-
tiate a preliminary investigation which the Under Secretary-
General and the DGACM failed to conduct.  The Appeals Tri-
bunal upheld the decision that there was an obligation to in-
vestigate but vacated the award of damages.  
 In Nwuke v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, the 
Applicant requested the Dispute Tribunal to compel the Ad-
ministration to investigate a series of complaints about dis-
crimination he had filed against the Senior Management of the 
United Nation Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), to order 
the Administration to perform different actions concerning the 
selection process, and order the Administration to treat him in 
a non-discriminatory way.95  The Dispute Tribunal held that it 
could not compel the Organization to investigate the staff 
member’s complaints against the ECA’s Senior Management.    
 The Appeals Tribunal held that a staff member has no 
right to compel the Administration to conduct an investigation, 
unless such a right is granted by the UN Staff Regulations and 
                                                             
94 Revised Disciplinary Measures and Procedures 2010, supra note 30, at 
II, ¶ (2)(g). 
95 Nwuke v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judgments U.N. 
App. Trib., No. 2010/UNAT/099 (Dec. 28, 2010), available at 
http://www.un.org/en /oaj/files/unat/judgments/2010-unat-099.pdf.  
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Rules.   
When a staff member files a complaint and makes accusations 
about administrative violations of law, the Administration can 
exercise its discretion and decide whether or not to undertake an 
(at least preliminary or summary) investigation.  The investiga-
tion into management and administrative practices in general or 
into disciplinary cases is a matter within the discretion of the 
Administration.”  
In disciplinary cases, a possible disciplinary procedure con-
cerns the right of the accused staff member.  Therefore a staff 
member does not have a right to request the Administration to 
take a disciplinary action against another staff member.  The 
decision whether to undertake an investigation into allegations 
against a staff member is a discretionary action of the Admin-
istration and does not directly affect the rights of another staff 
member.   
C. Staff Member’s Obligation to Cooperate with OIOS 
Investigations   
In Yapa v. the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
the Applicant worked at the United Nations Office in Geneva 
and took a French written exam and was found attempting to 
cheat during the test.96  Mr. Yapa was informed by OHRM 
that he was charged with attempting to cheat on an examina-
tion for promotion when he was found with external papers on 
his desk.  After the incident was reported the Applicant was 
contacted to obtain his version of the facts.  The Applicant re-
fused to discuss the incident or to participate in the investiga-
tion.  The Applicant was charged with attempting to cheat in 
an examination and refusing to cooperate in the investigation.  
The Appeals Tribunal held that a staff member may at any 
time be required by the Secretary-General to supply infor-
mation concerning facts relevant to his or her integrity, con-
duct and service as a staff member.  This provision is not in-
compatible with a fundamental rule or principle of law 
international law applicable to staff members of the Organiza-
tion.  The Appeals Tribunal found that the Applicant’s refusal 
                                                             
96 Yapa v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judgments U.N. 
App. Trib., No. 2011/UNAT/168 (Oct. 21, 2011), available at 
http://www.staffrights.org/sites/ default/files/2011-unat-168e.pdf.  
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to cooperate in the investigation to determine whether he had 
attempted to cheat on an examination constituted professional 
misconduct.  
D. Right to Counsel  
The Dispute Tribunal considered in Atana v. Secretary-
General of the United Nations, the issue of the right to counsel 
during an investigation interview.97   The former Administra-
tive Instruction ST/AI/371 and the revised Administrative In-
struction ST/AI/371, Amend. 1., provide for the right to counsel 
during the formal disciplinary proceedings in which the Admin-
istration submits formal charges against the staff member.  
The OIOS “Investigations Manual” does not provide for a law-
yer to be present at the interview.98  In Atana the written rec-
ords of the interview did not show that the Applicant requested 
the assistance of counsel.    
In Atana, the Dispute Tribunal noted that “UNAT juris-
prudence (states) that based on the staff rules there is no man-
datory right to counsel for staff members who are undergoing 
interviews during the preliminary investigation of allegations 
for misconduct.”  In Powell v. the Secretary-General of the Unit-
ed Nations, the Appeals Tribunal held that due process rights 
provided in the former Staff Rule 110.4 and former Adminis-
trative Instruction ST/AI/371 cannot apply during the prelimi-
nary investigation because “they would hinder it.”99   Any in-
vestigation preceding the initiation of disciplinary charges is 
considered a preliminary investigation.  Preliminary investiga-
tions have limited due process rights.  Therefore, Atana held 
that OIOS is not obligated to allow a staff member to have 
counsel during the preliminary investigations.  
In a recent Appeals Tribunal case of Akello v. Secretary-
General of the United Nations, the Applicant joined the United 
Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) as a Ra-
                                                             
97 Atana v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judgments U.N. 
Dispute Trib., No. UNDT/2012/068 (Apr. 19, 2013), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/oaj/files/undt /judgments/undt-2013-068.pdf. 
98 Investigations Manual, supra note 25.  
99 Powell v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judgments U.N. 
App. Trib., No. 2013/UNAT/295 (Mar. 28, 2013), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/oaj/files/unat /judgments/2013-unat-295.pdf.  
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dio Operator in Moroto, Uganda.100  The Applicant’s contract 
was administered by UNDP.  Due to the security situation in 
the Moroto region, it was mandatory for all UN official travel to 
be under escort of armed military personnel driven in private-
ly-owned vehicles.  These vehicles were hired through the Ap-
plicant’s UNDSS office in Moroto.  In March 2009 it came to 
the attention of UNDSS, Moroto, that the Applicant was in-
volved in the management of a company, which owned a vehi-
cle on the UNDSS list of companies providing escort vehicle 
services.  A Board of Inquiry was constituted to look into the 
allegations of conflict of interest and found that the Applicant 
was involved in the management of the company, which pro-
vided services to the UN.  The UNDSS Internal Affairs Unit 
(IAU) subsequently conducted an investigation into other com-
plaints and issued its investigation report finding that the Ap-
plicant served as one of the signatories of the companies’ bank 
account and, on behalf of the company, signed invoices and 
submitted them to the OHCHR.  The UNDSS IAU determined 
that she was guilty of misconduct.   
The Applicant contended that the facts of the case imposed 
an obligation upon the Administration to advise her of her 
right to seek assistance of counsel and that meeting with inves-
tigators indicated the disciplinary process surpassed the pre-
liminary stage.  The UNDP Office of Audit and Investigations 
(OAI Guidelines) described who could be present during an in-
vestigation interview:101  
[u]nder special circumstances, witnesses or suspects can 
request to be accompanied by an observer (who has no connec-
tion to the investigation and is readily available).  Considering 
the cultural context, gender balance and other elements of the 
case, the investigator may approve the request and select the 
observer (e.g. field security officer, lawyer etc.). 
The Dispute Tribunal held that the investigators had the 
obligation to notify the Applicant of her right to the assistance 
of counsel during the investigation.  The Appeals Tribunal in 
Atana considered, inter alia, whether a staff member should be 
informed of his or her right to seek the assistance of counsel 
                                                             
100 Akello v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judgments U.N. 
App. Trib., No. 2013/UNAT/336 (June 28, 2013), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/oaj/files/unat /judgments/2013-UNAT-336.pdf.  
101 Id. at ¶ 27.  
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during the investigation phase.  The Appeals Tribunal held in a 
previous judgment, Applicant v. Secretary-General of the Unit-
ed Nations, that Staff Rule 10.3(a) provides that disciplinary 
proceedings are initiated when the “findings of an investigation 
indicate that misconduct may have occurred.”102 The Applicant 
contends that in the first investigation, conducted by the Board 
of Inquiry, unlawfully and irregularly, had already generated 
sufficient grounds to believe that misconduct may have oc-
curred.  The second investigation, conducted by UNDSS and 
the IAU, is indicative that investigators knew misconduct may 
have occurred and thus necessitated the Applicant’s right to 
counsel:103 
our jurisprudence remains that the due process entitlements, 
which every staff member has, come into play in their en-
tirety once a disciplinary process is initiated. (emphasis 
added)  Furthermore, we have held in Powell that at the prelimi-
nary investigation stage, only limited due process rights apply.104  
The Appeals Tribunal held that the Applicant did not have 
a right to counsel during the investigation stage.  The charge 
letter initiated the disciplinary proceedings wherein the staff 
member was notified of her right to counsel to assist in her de-
fense.  The staff member has a right to counsel only after the 
initiation of the formal disciplinary process through a charge 
letter.  
VIII. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF OIOS ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION TO 
CLOSE THE CASE  
A. A decision taken by OIOS not to refer the findings of the 
investigation to the disciplinary process is an administrative 
decision which can be appealed before UN judicial system.  
Can a staff member appeal a decision by the OIOS not to 
undertake an investigation?  
If OIOS decides to undertake an investigation, then the fi-
nal outcome of the Investigation Report which contains the 
                                                             
102 Applicant v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judgments 
U.N. App. Trib., No. 2012/UNAT/209 (Mar. 16, 2013), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/oaj/files/ unat/judgments/2012-unat-209.pdf.  
103 See Akello, supra note 100 at ¶ 36. 
104 See Powell, supra note 99. 
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findings and recommendations are submitted to the Head of 
Office or responsible officer in accordance with 
ST/AI/371/Amend.1.  Since this is a recommendation, the In-
vestigation Report cannot be subject to appeal at this stage of 
the proceedings.  However, if OIOS decides not to undertake an 
investigation, which closes the case and the Report is not sub-
mitted, is this decision subject to appeal to the UN Tribunals?  
In the case of Koda v. Secretary-General of the United Na-
tions, the Appeals Tribunal held that any OIOS decision which 
affects an employee’s terms or conditions of employment can be 
appealed by a staff member.105  If an OIOS audit report is 
found flawed, then the Administration’s disciplinary action 
based upon the findings in the report must be set aside.  In the 
lower court ruling, the Dispute Tribunal found that the OIOS 
audit report was “inadequate, unfair, and one-sided” and con-
tained such patent shortcomings that it should not have been 
presented as there was no “process of investigation described or 
reasoning expressed that justifies any confidence in the rec-
ommendations.”106  The Dispute Tribunal held that since the 
audit report did not constitute a breach of her contractual 
rights, the Tribunal dismissed her application.   
First, the Appeals Tribunal considered whether the OIOS 
audit report was an administrative decision upon which a staff 
member can appeal the findings.  The Appeals Tribunal deter-
mined that OIOS operates under the “authority” of the Secre-
tary-General but has “operational independence”.  As to issues 
concerning budget and oversight functions, the General As-
sembly delegated this function to the Secretary-General.107  
The Appeals Tribunal held that as to the contents and proce-
dures of an OIOS audit report, the Secretary-General has no 
power or authority to influence or interfere with OIOS.  The 
UN Tribunals can only review the Secretary-General’s admin-
istrative decisions.  As OIOS is part of the Secretariat, it is sub-
                                                             
105 Koda v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judgments U.N. 
App. Trib., No. 2011/UNAT/130 (July 8, 2011), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/oaj/files /unat/judgments/2011-unat-130.pdf.  
106 Koda v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judgments U.N. 
Disp. Trib., No. UNDT/2011/110 (June 24, 2010), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/oaj/files/undt /judgments/undt-2010-110.pdf. 
107 Review of the Efficiency of the Administrative and Financial Func-
tioning of the United Nations, supra note 4.  
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ject to the internal justice system.  Therefore, the Appeals Tri-
bunal can judicially review OIOS decisions which affect an em-
ployee’s terms or contract of employment.      
In the case of Koda, the Dispute Tribunal held that the 
Secretary-General does not have any powers in respect of 
changing the content of an audit report.  OIOS is independent 
in respect of its functions involving the conduct of audit inves-
tigations.  The Appeals Tribunal determined that the OIOS 
audit report was fundamentally flawed both legally and factu-
ally.  The Appeals Tribunal held that, in this case, the OIOS 
audit report was not used as a basis for determining the disci-
plinary action, therefore there was no adverse effects on the 
staff member’s reputation and upheld the judgment.  
In the case of Comerford-Verzuu v. Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, the Appeals Tribunal relied upon its ruling in 
Koda.108  The staff member filed an appeal against the failure 
of OIOS to investigate her complaint against the former Ad-
ministrator of UNDP and the Director, Office of Legal and Pro-
curement Support, UNDP, for intimidation, harassment, in vio-
lation of the UN standards of conduct.  OIOS evaluated the 
staff member’s complaint and determined that, since her com-
plaint was similar to a previous complaint, which had been 
considered, the matter was closed.  The Dispute Tribunal found 
that the staff member’s request for administrative review was 
time-barred and rejected her appeal.    
The Appeals Tribunal upheld the decision of the Dispute 
Tribunal and, of note, held that the contested decision by the 
Under Secretary-General of OIOS not to consider her request 
to investigate her complaint was an appealable administrative 
decision.  In the cross-appeal before the Appeals Tribunal, the 
Secretary-General challenged the UNDT’s finding that the Sec-
retary-General may be held liable for the acts or omission of 
OIOS.  The Appeals Tribunal reaffirmed its decision in Koda 
that OIOS as part of the UN Secretariat is subject to the inter-
nal justice system whose decisions can be reviewed by the Dis-
pute and Appeals Tribunals: 
OIOS operates under the ‘authority’ of the Secretary-General, but 
                                                             
108 Comerford-Verzuu v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judg-
ments U.N. App. Trib., No. 2012/UNAT/203 (Mar. 16, 2012), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/oaj/ files/unat/judgments/2012-unat-203.pdf. 
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has ‘operational independence’.  As to the issues of budget and 
oversight functions in general, the General Assembly resolution 
calls for the Secretary-General’s involvement. Further, the Secre-
tary-General is charged with ensuring that ‘procedures are also 
in place’ to protect fairness and due-process rights of staff mem-
bers. It seems that the drafters of this legislation sought to both 
establish the ‘operational independence’ of OIOS and keep it in 
an administrative framework. We hold that, insofar as the 
contents and procedures of an individual report are con-
cerned, the Secretary-General has no power to influence 
or interfere with OIOS. (emphasis added) Thus the UNDT also 
has no jurisdiction to do so, as it can only review the Secretary-
General’s administrative decisions. But this is a minor distinc-
tion. Since OIOS is part of the Secretariat, it is of course subject 
to the Internal Justice System.109 
The Appeals Tribunal held that the OIOS’ reply to the staff 
member was the administrative decision upon which the Appel-
lant could seek review.  The Appeals Tribunal held that any 
subsequent correspondence did not extend the time limit for 
seeking administrative review.  The UN Tribunals do not have 
power to interfere with the contents and procedures of an indi-
vidual report.  The Appeals Tribunal held that any communica-
tion from OIOS to a staff member concerning a final decision 
on an investigation is an administrative decision, which can be 
appealed to the UN Tribunals.  
If the decision of OIOS is an administrative decision, as 
judicially determined by the UN Appeals Tribunal, can it be 
reviewed as a request for management evaluation under UN 
staff rule 11.1?  
B. Management evaluation of an administrative decision taken 
by OIOS under UN staff rule 11.2 (a)  
The UN requires the staff member to file a quest for a 
management evaluation of the administrative decision in order 
to have recourse to the formal judicial system. In accordance 
with staff rule 11.2 (a): 
“A staff member wishing to formally contest an administrative 
decision alleging non-compliance with his or her contract of em-
ployment or terms of appointment, including all pertinent regula-
                                                             
109 See Koda, supra note 105 at ¶ 2. 
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tions and rules pursuant to staff regulation 11.1(a), shall, as a 
first step, submit to the Secretary-General in writing a request 
for a management evaluation of the administrative decision.110   
The Dispute Tribunal in Nwuke v. the Secretary-General 
considered whether a OIOS decision to or not investigation is 
an administrative decision which can be reviewed under staff 
rule 11.1.112.111  
 The Appeals Tribunal decided in Comerford-Verzuu v. 
Secretary-General of the United Nations and Koda v. Secretary-
General of the United Nations that an OIOS decision is an ad-
ministrative decision.  In order to challenge an administrative 
decision within the UN administration of justice system, ac-
cording to staff rule 11.2(a), a request for management evalua-
tion must be submitted to the Secretary-General. The purpose 
of this formal requirement, imposed by General Assembly reso-
lutions 55/159 and 63/253 respectively, as a prior obligation of 
the staff member for filing an application to the UN Dispute 
Tribunal is to allow the Secretary-General to undertake a 
management review and overturn the contested decision, if he 
considers it necessary.     
However, General Assembly Resolution 48/218 B and Sec-
retary-General Bulletin ST/SGB/273 state that the purpose of 
OIOS is “to assist the Secretary-General in fulfilling his inter-
nal oversight responsibilities in respect of the resources and 
staff of the Organization.”112  Further, OIOS “shall exercise op-
erational independence under the authority of the Secretary-
General.”113   
How do you reconcile these two principles: the operational 
independence of OIOS, as stated in the General Assembly Res-
olutions and the Secretary-General Bulletin, with the legal ob-
ligation of the Secretary-General, under staff rule 11.2(a) and 
also in accordance with the General Assembly Resolutions, to 
allow the Secretary-General to undertake a management eval-
uation of the decision to or not to investigate as decided by 
OIOS?  
                                                             
110 United Nations Staff Regulations and Staff Rules, U.N. staff rule 11.2. 
111 See Nwuke, supra note 95 at ¶ 35.  
112 U.N. Secretariat, Secretary-General’s Bulletin, ¶ 5(a), ¶ 5(c), (Sept. 7, 
1994), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/oios/documents/st_sgb273.pdf 
[hereinafter Secretary-General’s Bulletin].    
113 Id. at ¶ 2. 
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  The Dispute Tribunal found itself confronted with these 
two principles, “on the one hand, the operational independence 
of OIOS and on the other, the binding nature of the request to 
the Secretary-General for review or management evaluation of 
the decision taken by OIOS in the exercise of its investigative 
function.”114  The Dispute Tribunal held that:  
where the contested decision is a decision taken by OIOS in the 
exercise of its investigative functions, the Secretary-General may 
not, by virtue of resolution 48/218 B, annul or modify that deci-
sion. It follows that the Secretary-General, faced with the Appli-
cant’s request for review of the decision of OIOS refusing to con-
duct an investigation, has no choice but to confirm that decision.  
In the view of the Dispute Tribunal, the General Assembly 
intended that the OIOS should be operationally independent of 
the Administration and the Secretary-General.  The General 
Assembly resolution and the legislative history of the resolu-
tion establishing OIOS does not make reference that the deci-
sions of the OIOS cannot be subject to judicial review.  Fur-
thermore, as noted by the Dispute Tribunal, it is unacceptable 
in a legal system such as that of the United Nations that a staff 
member should not have access to justice to assert his or her 
rights.  
When faced with the apparent contradictory instruments 
of equal value, the UN Dispute Tribunal held that it must give 
precedence to the staff member’s right of access to justice. The 
Dispute Tribunal held that “the fact that the Secretary-General 
may not modify the OIOS decision cannot operate to prevent 
the staff member from contesting it before the Tribunal.”115 
Based on the jurisprudence of the UN Tribunals, a decision 
taken by OIOS whether to investigate or not is an administra-
tive decision.  As an administrative decision, a staff member 
may submit a request for management evaluation against the 
OIOS decision.  The Secretary-General must undertake a man-
agement evaluation of the OIOS decision. However, by virtue of 
the “operational independence” of OIOS, the Secretary-General 
cannot annul or modify the decision. The Secretary-General 
                                                             
114 Comferford-Verzuu, supra note 108.   
115 Kunanayakam  v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judg-
ments U.N. Dispute Trib., No. UNDT/2011/006 (Jan. 10, 2011) (not appealed 
to UN Appeals Tribunal), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/oaj/files/undt/judgments/undt-2011-006e.pdf.  
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can only review whether the appropriate procedures were fol-
lowed by OIOS in the administrative decision.   
After the management evaluation has been concluded, if 
the staff member is not satisfied with the response to the man-
agement evaluation, he or she has a right to file an application 
to the UN Dispute Tribunal against the contested administra-
tive decision in accordance with staff rule 11.4.    
C. Limited judicial review by the UN Tribunals of an OIOS 
decision to close the case.   
What is the judicial review by the UN Tribunals in a dis-
pute between the staff member and the decision by OIOS to 
close an investigation?  In the Dispute Tribunal case of Kuna-
nayakam v. the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the 
Applicant contested the decision of the OIOS not to carry out 
an investigation into the disappearance of documents and per-
sonal effects she had placed in her office.116  The OIOS in-
formed the Applicant that it decided not to take action on her 
request and to instead to refer the matter to the UNOG Safety 
and Security Section since it was a “Category II matter involv-
ing an alleged theft.”  The Applicant requested a review of the 
decision by the Director of the Investigations Division, which 
rejected her request for an investigation.  
In the deliberation of Kunanayakam, the Dispute Tribunal 
referred to the legislative history of the OIOS.117  The Tribunal 
noted that in the General Assembly resolution 48/218 B, dated 
29 July 1994, OIOS shall “investigate reports of violations of 
United Nations regulations, rules, and pertinent administra-
tive issuances and transmit to the Secretary-General the re-
sults of such investigations together with appropriate recom-
mendations to guide the Secretary-General in deciding on 
jurisdictional or disciplinary action to be taken.”118  General 
Assembly resolution 59/287 of 13 April 2005 furthermore rec-
ognized that OIOS “has established an efficient mechanism to 
enable all staff members … to convey directly their allegations 
to the Office of Internal Oversight Services.”119  The Tribunal 
                                                             
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 G.A. Res. 48, ¶ 5(c)(iv), U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/218 (July 29, 2994).  
119 G.A. Res. 59, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/287 (Apr. 13, 2005).  
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referred to the Secretary-General’s Bulletin, ST/SGB/273, es-
tablishing OIOS, which provides: “the Office may receive and 
investigate reports from staff reporting perceived cases of pos-
sible violations of rules or regulations, mismanagement, mis-
conduct, waste of resources or abuse of authority.”120  
The Dispute Tribunal determined that the language of the 
aforementioned General Assembly resolutions and Bulletin 
made it clear that UN staff members have the right to report 
cases of presumed violation of their rights directly to OIOS.121   
The Dispute Tribunal cited the Appeals Tribunal’s judg-
ment in Nwuke v. the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
which concerned the refusal by the Administration to investi-
gate complaints by the staff members concerned.122 The Ap-
peals Tribunal considered that it was competent to exercise ju-
dicial control over such decisions since it was a decision of a 
discretionary nature and directly affected the rights of the 
claimant.  The Appeals Tribunal thus held, “that this Tribunal 
has jurisdiction to rule on the decision of the OIOS not to 
launch its own investigation in response to the Applicant’s re-
quest. That said, the Tribunal is bound to examine the legal 
arguments that could operate to negate such jurisdiction.”123  
  The Appeals Tribunal considered that it was clear that 
the General Assembly intended to confer “operational inde-
pendence” on OIOS— which prevents any staff member, even 
the Secretary-General, from giving it instructions in its inves-
tigative work.  However, the Secretary-General, as Chief Ad-
ministrative Officer, is administratively responsible for any 
breaches or illegalities OIOS might commit.    
The Dispute Tribunal decided in Kunanayakam that an 
OIOS decision not to undertake the investigation requested by 
the Applicant is an administrative decision appealable to the 
Tribunal.  In Kunanayakam, the Dispute Tribunal held that it 
was clear from the evidence that the refusal of OIOS to investi-
gate the facts brought to its attention by the Applicant was mo-
tivated by the view taken by the OIOS Investigations Division, 
as stated in its letters of 21 April and 7 June 2006 which the 
                                                             
120 Secretary-General’s Bulletin, supra note 112, at ¶ 18. 
121 Cases must fall within the categories listed in paragraph 18 of bulle-
tin ST/SGB/273. 
122 Nwuke, supra note 95, at 70.  
123 Id. 
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Applicant contests, that the investigation requested by the Ap-
plicant could be entrusted to another investigative unit.124 The 
Dispute Tribunal decided that when it receives a request from 
a staff member for an investigation, OIOS must, as a prelimi-
nary matter, determine whether to undertake the investigation 
itself or refer the matter to another investigative unit. Thus, 
contrary to the Applicant’s contention, OIOS, if deemed appro-
priate, has the authority to entrust the investigation to another 
investigative agency, the UN Safety and Security Section.  In 
the light of the foregoing, the Tribunal considered that the de-
cision by OIOS not to conduct an investigation itself, but to re-
fer the case to the Safety and Security Section, was a legiti-
mate and reasonable exercise of its discretionary powers.   
Having regard to the nature of the mission conferred on 
OIOS, the Dispute Tribunal held that the judicial review of the 
Tribunal over a decision of OIOS is limited as follows:125  
the Tribunal can exercise no more than a minimum degree of 
control over the lawfulness of its operational decisions, limited to 
verifying the regularity of the procedure followed, and determin-
ing whether there was a mistake of fact or a manifest error in the 
exercise of its discretion. 
The Dispute Tribunal determined that there is limited judicial 
review of a decision by OIOS not to investigate or close a case.  
The judicial review is limited to verifying that the appropriate 
procedures were followed, whether either was a mistake of fact, 
or a manifest error in the exercise of its discretionary authori-
ty.   
IX. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DUE PROCESS RIGHTS DURING THE 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS   
The above considered whether a decision by OIOS not to 
investigate a case can be reviewed by the UN Judicial Tribu-
nals.   The Tribunals have decided that it has the authority to 
                                                             
124 See Kunanayakam, supra note 115. The possibility for the OIOS to 
classify cases into two separate categories depending on their seriousness and 
complexity was introduced in report A/58/708 on strengthening the investiga-
tion functions in the United Nations, which that Office submitted to the Gen-
eral Assembly in 2004.  It drew a distinction between category I, which in-
cluded high-risk, complex matters and serious criminal cases and category II, 
covering cases of lower risk to the Organization.  
125 Id. at ¶ 43. 
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review the OIOS decision not to investigate as an administra-
tive decision, which can be appealed to the UN Tribunals.  
However, the review of the OIOS decision not to investigate is 
a limited judicial review, can only consider whether the appro-
priate procedures were followed, whether the decision was 
based upon a mistake of fact, or whether there was a manifest 
error in the exercise of its discretionary authority.    
If OIOS decides the investigation showed sufficient evi-
dence indicating the staff member engaged in wrongdoing that 
could amount to misconduct, OIOS will submit an Investiga-
tion Report to the Head of Office or responsible officer.126 The 
Investigation Report contains the findings of the investigation, 
the supporting documentary evidence, and recommendations.  
The Investigation Report submitted to the Head of Office is not 
a decision by OIOS; it is a recommendation.  At this stage, the 
Investigation Report itself cannot be appealed to the Dispute 
Tribunal since it only makes findings and recommendations.   
The Head of Office reviews the Investigation Report and for-
wards the matter, which includes the Investigation Report, to 
the ASG, OHRM.127 The ASG, OHRM, upon consideration of 
the entire dossier, may decide that there is enough evidence to 
commence formal charges of misconduct against the staff 
member.128  
If the ASG, OHRM decided that misconduct has occurred, 
a recommendation for the imposition of disciplinary measures 
will be taken by the Under Secretary-General for Management 
on behalf of the Secretary-General.129 The Under Secretary-
General on behalf of the Secretary-General makes the final de-
cision whether to impose a disciplinary measure.  This is the 
decision against which the staff member can file an application.  
A staff member against whom a disciplinary or a non-
disciplinary measure has been imposed following the conclu-
sion of the disciplinary process is not required to request a 
management evaluation.  The staff member may submit an ap-
plication directly to the Dispute Tribunal in accordance with 
Chapter XI of the Staff Rules against the disciplinary meas-
                                                             
126 Revised Disciplinary Measures and Procedures 2010, supra note 30, 
at 69-70. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at ¶ 9(a) and (b). 
129 Id. 
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ure.130  
The following is a discussion on the judicial review of the 
due process requirements in a disciplinary proceeding based on 
the facts established in an OIOS Investigation Report.  
A.  Due Process Rights of a Staff Member during the 
Disciplinary Proceedings  
In Cabrera v. the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
a disciplinary action based upon former Administrative In-
struction, ST/AI/371, stated the specific procedural steps for 
disciplinary matters as follows, inter alia:131  
d. A decision by the ASG/OHRM, whether the matter should be 
pursued with written allegations of misconduct (sec. 5);   
e. The initiation of a formal investigation with the filing of formal 
charges against the staff member (sec. 6);   
f. The implementation of due process rights for the staff member 
and right of the reply for the staff member (sec. 6); and  
g. The review by the relevant official of the entire dossier on 
whether the matter should proceed further (sec. 9a);… 
Cabrera further stated that where the threshold has been 
reached, and that the decision has been made, that the matter 
is of such gravity that it should be pursued further, the investi-
gation ceases to be preliminary and in substance “converts to a 
formal investigation with a focus on a specific staff member.”132  
In the case of the Dispute Tribunal, Johnson v. Secretary-
General of the United Nations, the Applicant was one of eight 
staff members who worked for the Procurement Division, the 
Department of Management.133 The Applicant was placed on 
special leave with full pay on Jan. 16 2006 following issuance of 
a Dec. 2005 draft audit report into procurement activities and a 
follow-up investigation by the Procurement Task Force (PTF) of 
                                                             
130 Id. at ¶ 10. 
131 Cabrera v. the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judgments 
U.N. Dispute Trib., No. 2011/UNDT/081, at ¶ 75 (May 6, 2011), available at 
http://www.un.org /en/oaj/files/undt/judgments/undt-2011-081.pdf. 
132 Id. at ¶ 76. 
133 Johnson v. the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judgments 
U.N. Dispute Trib., No. 2011/UNDT/123, at ¶ 1 (June 30, 2011), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/oaj /files/undt/judgments/undt-2011-123.pdf. 
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OIOS.134 The Dispute Tribunal inquired whether the PTF and 
OIOS, investigation was a preliminary investigation under 
former Administration Instruction ST/AI/371, sec. 2, or a for-
mal investigation under ST/AI/371, sec. 6. for the ASG, OHRM 
to pursue the case.  The Dispute Tribunal held that where a 
decision of the ASG,OHRM has been made that the matter is of 
such gravity that it should be pursued further, the investiga-
tion at that point ceases to be preliminary and, in substance, 
converts to a formal investigation with a focus on a specific 
staff member.  
The Dispute Tribunal in Johnson listed the rights afforded 
to the Applicant under ST/AI/371, sec. 6:   
a. Sec. 6(a)—the right to be informed of the allegations and of the 
right to respond to the allegations;   
b. Sec. 6(b)—the right to be provided with documentary evidence 
of the alleged misconduct;   
c. Sec. 6(c)—the right to be informed of his right to the advice of 
other staff members to assist in his responses:  
d. Sec. 6—the right to have the Secretary-General himself au-
thorize the suspension:   
e. Sec. 7—the right to be given a specified time to answer the al-
legations and to be informed of the procedure for producing coun-
tervailing evidence  
f. Sec. 8, secs. 6(a)-(c)—the right to have the entire dossier (in-
cluding the staff member’s reply and countervailing evidence) 
submitted to the ASG/OHRM;   
g. Sec. 9(a)—the right to be informed, if the case is closed, that 
the charges have been dropped and that no further action will be 
taken:   
Following the investigation, the staff member must be no-
tified, in writing, of the charges and given the opportunity to 
respond to those charges.  No disciplinary measure may be im-
posed on a staff member following the completion of an investi-
gation unless the due process rights are followed.   In Johnson, 
the Tribunal found that a fundamental principle of due process, 
when an individual has become the target of an investigation 
or reasonably concludes that he has been identified as a possi-
                                                             
134 Id. 
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ble wrongdoer in any investigation procedure, that he has the 
right to invoke due process.  At the post-investigation stage, 
that person should be accorded certain due process rights.135  
In Johnson v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, the 
Dispute Tribunal found that having passed the threshold of a 
preliminary investigation, the OIOS and PTF investigation 
constituted a formal investigation under ST/AI/371, section 6.  
The Organization should have implemented for the staff mem-
ber the due process protections of ST/AI/371. 
B. Standard of Proof in Disciplinary Cases – Clear and 
convincing evidence  
How does the UN Tribunals assess whether the evidence 
in the Investigation Report amounts to misconduct?  
In Molari v. Secretary-General of the United Nations the 
Appeals Tribunal held that the standard of proof to terminate a 
staff member for misconduct must be established by clear and 
convincing evidence.136 Clear and convincing proof requires 
more than, a preponderance of the evidence, but less than, 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  Clear and convincing evi-
dence means that the truth of the facts asserted is highly prob-
able.  In the case of Molari, the staff member submitted to the 
Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) through UNOPS re-
ceipts for unusual grocery purchases for VAT reimbursement 
claim.  The Executive Director of UNOPS established an en-
quiry panel to investigate the matter.  The Enquiry Panel de-
termined that Ms. Molari had falsely certified store receipts as 
being eligible for VAT reimbursement.  The UNOPS Executive 
Director informed Ms. Molari that she would be separated from 
service with one month’s notice and payment of termination 
indemnity.  The decision was upheld by the UN Dispute Tribu-
nal and Ms. Molari appealed the decision to the Appeals Tribu-
nal.    
In Ms. Molari’s case, the facts were irrefutable that she 
had committed misconduct, and that there was plausible ex-
planation. The Appeals Tribunal upheld the judgment.  The 
                                                             
135 See Johnson, supra note 133.  
136 Molari v. the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judgments 
U.N. Appeals Trib., No. 2011-UNAT-164, at ¶ 2 (Oct. 21, 2011), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/ oaj/files/unat/judgments/2011-unat-164.pdf.  
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Appeals Tribunal stated that it would not follow the Interna-
tional Labo[u]r Organization (ILOAT) standard of proof in dis-
ciplinary cases as beyond a reasonable doubt.  The UN Appeals 
Tribunal held that since disciplinary cases in the UN are not 
criminal and liberty is not at stake, when termination is a pos-
sible outcome, misconduct must be established by clear and 
convincing evidence.137 “[W]hen termination is a possible out-
come, misconduct must be established by clear and convincing 
evidence”, which “means that the truth of the facts asserted is 
highly probable.”138 
X.  JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE FACTS IN THE INVESTIGATION 
REPORT – A RE-INVESTIGATION OF THE CASE OR A LIMITED 
JUDICIAL REVIEW?  
What is the role of the Dispute Tribunals and the Appeals 
Tribunal when reviewing a disciplinary sanction imposed by 
the Administration based on the evidence contained in an In-
vestigation Report?  
A. Standard of Review in Disciplinary Cases  
The former UN Administrative Tribunal established 
standards for the review of administrative actions in relation to 
disciplinary matters in UN employment.  The leading authority 
relevant to the judicial review of facts of misconduct is the for-
mer United Nations Administrative Tribunal’s decision in Ki-
wanuka.139 Kiwanuka held that in disciplinary matters “the 
Tribunal had a duty to examine the facts and the evidence crit-
ically and fully and to review the Administration’s decision.”140 
It also held that the former United Nations Administrative 
Tribunal’s jurisprudence would be considered as “prevailing 
authority”.  Kiwanuka provided the historical jurisprudence for 
the UN Appeals Tribunal in the consideration of standards for 
review of administrative decisions in disciplinary matters.   
                                                             
137 Id. at ¶ 30.  
138 Id. 
139 Kiwanuka v. the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judgments 
U.N. Admin. Trib., No. 941, U.N. Doc. AT/NOV/941 (1999), available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/UNAT/UNAT_Judgements/Judgements_E/UNAT_0094
1_E.pdf.  
140 Id. at § VI. 
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The UN Appeals Tribunal established the standard for ju-
dicial review in disciplinary cases very early in its jurispru-
dence.  In Mahdi v. Commissioner-General of the United Na-
tions Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the 
Near East, the staff member gave himself unauthorized access 
to the telephone line of his employer, UNRWA, and tampered 
with the billing system.141 A Board of Inquiry (BoI) was estab-
lished to investigate the allegation of the unauthorized access 
to the telephone lines. The BoI issued its report and based on 
its findings, UNRWA summarily dismissed the Appellant.  The 
UN Appeals Tribunal examined the following in reviewing the 
disciplinary case:  
i. Whether the facts on which the disciplinary measure was based 
have been established;  
ii. Whether the established facts legally amount to misconduct 
under the Regulations and Rules; and  
iii. Whether the disciplinary measure applied is proportionate to 
the offence.  
Based on the above standard of review, the Appeals Tribu-
nal affirmed the decision to dismiss the Appellant.    
In Maslamani v. Commissioner-General of UNRWA, a case 
relating to summary dismissal, the Appeals Tribunal held that 
consideration was given to “(1) the broad discretionary authori-
ty of the UNRWA Commissioner-General in disciplinary mat-
ters; (2) whether the facts on which the Appellant’s termination 
was based were established; (3) whether the established facts 
legally amounted to serious misconduct; and (4) whether there 
had been no substantive or procedural irregularity.”142 The Ap-
peals Tribunal reaffirmed this standard of review in discipli-
nary cases and upheld the summary dismissal. 143 
                                                             
141 Mahdi v. Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and 
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, Judgments U.N. Ap-
peals Trib., No. 2010-UNAT-018, at ¶ 1 (Mar. 30, 2010), available at 
http://www.staffrights.org/ sites/default/files/2010-unat-018.pdf.  
142 Maslamani v. Commissioner-General of UNRWA, Judgments U.N. 
Appeals Trib., No. 2010-UNAT-028 (Mar. 30, 2010), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/ oaj/unat/judgments/2010-unat-028.pdf.  
143 See also Haniya v. Commissioner-General of UNRWA, Judgments 
U.N. Appeals Trib., No. 2010-UNAT-024 (Mar. 30, 2010), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/oaj/unat/judgments/2010-unat-024.pdf; Adwan v. Com-
missioner-General of UNRWA, Judgments U.N. Appeals Trib., No. 2010-
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Shahatit v. Commissioner-General of the United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near 
East upheld the UNAT approach of the judicial review of a dis-
ciplinary sanction imposed by the Administration.144 In this 
case, the established facts showed that Mr. Shahatit’s negli-
gence facilitated the misconduct of other staff members.  Mr. 
Shahatit was given the opportunity to defend himself and did 
not prove any flaws in the administrative and disciplinary pro-
cedural process.  The Appeals Tribunal held that the role of the 
Tribunal is to examine whether the facts on which the sanction 
is based have been established, whether the established facts 
constitute misconduct, and whether the sanction is proportion-
ate to the offence.  The Commissioner-General had the delegat-
ed authority to impose the level of sanction she considered as 
appropriate which decision could only be reviewed in cases of 
“obvious absurdity or flagrant arbitrariness.”145 The Appeals 
Tribunal dismissed the appeal.     
In a case involving a challenge to an OIOS investigation, 
Makwaka v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, OIOS 
conducted an investigation into the allegations that the Appli-
cant had allegedly engaged in activities that, as a result of his 
use of the UN information and communication technology re-
sources, were in breach of the UN Staff Rules.146 The Applicant 
was interviewed by OIOS during the investigation and shown 
evidence of numerous pornographic images, including child 
pornography, which he forwarded to other UN staff members. 
The Applicant was provided with the opportunity to comment 
on the evidence before OIOS.  OIOS provided its Investigation 
Report to the Under-Secretary-General, Department of General 
Assembly and Conference Management, who referred the In-
                                                                                                                                        
UNAT-038 (Mar. 30, 2010); Masri v. Secretary-General of the United Na-
tions, Judgments U.N. Appeals Trib., No. 2010-UNAT-098 (Mar. 30, 2010).  
144 See Shahatit v. Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief 
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, Judgments U.N. 
App. Trib., No. 2012/UNAT/195, (Mar. 16, 2012), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/oaj/files/ unat/judgments/2012-unat-195.pdf. 
145 See Aqel v. Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and 
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, Judgments U.N. App. 
Trib., No. 2010/UNAT/040 at 9 (July 1, 2010), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/oaj/files/unat/ judgments/2010-unat-040.pdf.  
146 See Makwaka v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judgments 
U.N. Disp. Trib., No. 2013/UNDT/002 (Jan. 11, 2013), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/oaj/files/ undt/judgments/undt-2013-002.pdf. 
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vestigation Report to the Assistant Secretary-General, OHRM, 
for review and determination of the appropriate disciplinary 
action to be taken in accordance with former Administrative 
Instruction, ST/AI/371.  The USG for Management imposed the 
disciplinary measures of a written censure, demotion of one 
grade, deferment for three years of his eligibility for considera-
tion for promotion. The Applicant sought rescission before the 
UN Dispute Tribunal of the imposition of the disciplinary sanc-
tions.  
In Makwaka, the Applicant contended that his due process 
rights were breached during the investigation process. The Tri-
bunal considered whether there were any procedural irregular-
ities leading to the imposition of the contested disciplinary 
sanctions.  In the consideration of whether the Applicant’s due 
process rights were respected, the UN Dispute Tribunal re-
viewed the disciplinary decision in two separate phases:  (1) the 
investigative phase conducted by OIOS, and (2) the disciplinary 
process undertaken by OHRM upon receiving the OIOS’ inves-
tigation report.    
The UNDT considered the investigation stage, which pro-
vides for the Administration to conduct an investigation in ac-
cordance with the established due process procedures. As dis-
cussed above, this stage has limited due process rights.  The 
second stage is the submission of the findings in the investiga-
tion report to the ASG, OHRM, and, based upon the assess-
ment whether there is sufficient evidence of misconduct, formal 
charges are commenced against the staff member.   The Ad-
ministration must provide the staff member with a higher 
standard of procedural due process rights during the formal 
charges in the disciplinary process stage.  These are two sepa-
rate and distinct stages, which require different standards of 
procedural due process rights.   
In Makwaka, the UN Dispute Tribunal examined whether 
the Administration accorded due process rights to the staff 
member during the investigation stage. The Tribunal deter-
mined that the purpose of OIOS in the investigative phase was 
as follows:  
The purpose of OIOS is to conduct a neutral fact-finding 
investigation into, in cases such as the present, allegations put 
forward against a staff member. While an investigation is con-
sidered to be part of the process that occurs prior to OHRM be-
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ing seized of the matter, its findings, including any incriminat-
ing statements made by the staff member, become part of the 
record.  Consequently, any such process must still be conducted 
in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Organiza-
tion and it must respect a staff member’s rights to due pro-
cess.147  
The UN Dispute Tribunal considered in Makwaka whether 
the Applicant was able to review the interview record and the 
Investigation Report, as well as, all evidence in his favor, in-
cluding mitigating evidence, prior to the finalization of the re-
port.  The Applicant was provided with the opportunity to de-
fend himself during the preliminary stage of the investigation. 
The Tribunal referred to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (art.14) and the European Convention on 
Human Rights (art. 6), to determine whether the Applicant’s 
right to defend himself and present evidence in his defense had 
been respected in the investigation process.  The Dispute Tri-
bunal held that the Applicant should have the right to defend 
himself in person during the investigation.  In this case, there 
was no evidence that the Applicant requested and was denied 
either access to counsel or further opportunities to defend him-
self during either the investigation conducted by OIOS or the 
ensuing disciplinary process by the ASG, OHRM.     
Makwaka showed that the Applicant was aware of the al-
legations that served as a basis for the investigation. The Ap-
plicant cooperated with the investigation process and was pro-
vided the opportunity to review and provide comments on the 
investigation report prior to its finalization.  There were no un-
reasonable delays in the investigation conducted by OIOS.  
Consequently, the Applicant’s due process rights were not 
breached during the OIOS investigation stage. However upon 
being charged by OHRM with misconduct on November 4, 
2008, there were no further communications between the Ad-
ministration and the Applicant regarding this matter until 
April 13, 2010.  This resulted in a nearly 16 months delay.  The 
Applicant did not request compensation for delay, therefore, 
the Tribunal did not award any compensation. The Dispute 
Tribunal decided the disciplinary measures of written censure 
and demotion were lawful, proportional, and taken in accord-
                                                             
147 Id. at 13.  
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ance with the regulations and rules, therefore the disciplinary 
sanctions were not rescinded.   
B.  Limited judicial review of the facts of an OIOS investigation   
In Messinger v. the Secretary-General of the United Na-
tions, the UN Appeals Tribunal held that it is not the task of 
the UN Dispute Tribunal to conduct fresh investigations but to 
determine if there was a proper investigation into the allega-
tions.148 Judicial review of a disciplinary case requires the 
UNDT to consider the evidence adduced and the procedures 
utilized during the course of the investigation by the Admin-
istration.   In this context, the UNDT is “to examine whether 
the facts on which the sanction is based have been established, 
whether the established facts qualify as misconduct [under the 
Staff Regulations and Rules], and whether the sanction is pro-
portionate to the offence.”149 The Administration bears the bur-
den of establishing that the alleged misconduct for which a dis-
ciplinary measure has been taken against a staff member 
occurred.  
In Sanwidi v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, the 
UN Appeals Tribunal considered whether the UN Dispute Tri-
bunal erred on a question of law and exceeded its competence 
in substituting its own judgment for that of the Secretary-
General concerning the evaluation of facts and the appropriate 
disciplinary action.150 Sanwidi is an important case, which con-
sidered the limits of the UN Dispute Tribunal’s judicial review 
of the Secretary-General’s decision in disciplinary matters.  
                                                             
148 See Messinger v. the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judg-
ments U.N. App. Trib., No. 2011/UNAT/123 (Mar. 11, 2011), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/oaj /files/unat/judgments/2011-unat-123.pdf. 
149 See Diabagate v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judgments 
U.N. App. Trib., No. 2014/UNAT/403 (April 2, 2014), available at 
http://www.un.org/en /oaj/files/unat/judgments/2014-UNAT-403.pdf (citing 
Nyambuza v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judgment No. 
2013/UNAT/364; Masri v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judg-
ment No. 2010/UNAT/098; Sanwidi v. Secretary-General of the United Na-
tions, Judgment No. 2010/UNAT/084UNAT-024). 
150 See Sanwidi v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judgments 
U.N. App. Trib., No. 2010/UNAT/084 (Oct. 27, 2010), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/oaj /files/unat/judgments/2010-unat-084.pdf (citing 
Masri v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judgment No. 
2010/UNAT/098).  
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The issue before the Tribunal was whether the staff member 
was entitled to a complete review of the factual evidence 
through appeal.  
In exercising judicial review, the role of the Dispute Tribu-
nal is to determine if the administrative decision under chal-
lenge is reasonable and fair, legally and procedurally correct, 
and proportionate. As a result of judicial review, the Tribunal 
may find the impugned administrative decision to be unrea-
sonable, unfair, illegal, irrational, procedurally incorrect, or 
disproportionate. During this process the Dispute Tribu-
nal is not conducting a merit-based review, but a judi-
cial review. Judicial review is more concerned with ex-
amining how the decision-maker reached the impugned 
decision and not the merits of the decision-maker’s deci-
sion.  (emphasis added)  This process may give an impression 
to a lay person that the Tribunal has acted as an appellate au-
thority over the decision-maker’s administrative decision. This 
is a misunderstanding of the delicate task of conducting a judi-
cial review because due deference is always shown to the deci-
sion-maker, who in this case is the Secretary-General.  
The UN Appeals Tribunal, referring to its holding in Mah-
di, affirmed the lower court’s decision in Sanwidi to summarily 
dismiss the Applicant.151  
These two UN Appeals Tribunal cases, Sanwidi and Mah-
di, are leading precedents for the UN Dispute Tribunal that in 
the consideration of disciplinary cases, the review must be a 
judicial review of the facts of the case with due deference to the 
Secretary-General’s administrative decisions.  The UN Appeals 
Tribunal held in Sanwidi that the UN Dispute Tribunal, as the 
judicial authority for reviewing facts, must only consider how 
the decision-maker reached the impugned decision and not the 
merits of the decision-maker’s decision.  The UN Dispute Tri-
bunal cannot undertake a re-investigation of the facts of the 
case.  Upon a limited judicial review of the facts, the UN Dis-
pute Tribunal must apply the procedures as enunciated in 
Mahdi – whether the facts have been established, whether the 
established facts legally amount to misconduct, and whether 
the facts on which the disciplinary measure was based have 
been established; whether the established facts legally amount 
                                                             
151 Id. at 12. 
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to misconduct under the Regulations and Rules; and whether 
the disciplinary measure applied is proportionate to the of-
fence.152  
In the case of Applicant v. the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, the UN Appeals Tribunal ruled that the UN 
Dispute Tribunal made an error of law in failing to affirm the 
summary dismissal of the Applicant on the grounds he commit-
ted serious misconduct for sexually harassing four young 
men.153 In this case, a UNICEF staff member was summarily 
dismissed for sexual harassment of young men in a residential 
compound in Juba, South Sudan.  The security guards com-
plained to UNICEF that the staff member had made unwel-
come advances and inappropriately touched some of the com-
plainants.  The UNDT reviewed the evidence contained in the 
investigation, including the witnesses’ interviews and the in-
vestigators’ report, and concluded that the sanction of sum-
mary dismissal was based on unsubstantiated charges.  
The UN Appeals Tribunal held that when the UN Dispute 
Tribunal reviewed the evidence, it improperly placed itself in 
the Applicant’s shoes and did not evaluate the evidence objec-
tively. The UN Appeals Tribunal considered the review of the 
investigation by the UN Dispute Tribunal as “rank specula-
tion.”154  
  The UN Appeals Tribunal concluded that the UNDT 
erred in law and fact which resulted in a manifestly unreason-
able decision when it determined that the Complainants were 
not credible and the investigation report should not have relied 
on their statements and those of their supervisors. The evi-
dence in the record did not support the UNDT’s legal conclu-
sions and factual findings.155 The UN Appeals Tribunal vacated 
the UNDT’s decision.  
                                                             
152 Mahdi, supra note 14, at ¶ 27.  
153 See Applicant v. the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judg-
ments U.N. App. Trib., No. 2013/UNAT/302 (Mar. 28, 2013), available at 
http://www.un.org/en /oaj/files/unat/judgments/2013-unat-302.pdf. 
154 Id. at 16.  
155 Id. 
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XI. PRODUCTION OF OIOS INVESTIGATION REPORT TO THE 
STAFF MEMBER  
A. Staff Member’s right to receive a copy of the Investigation 
Report 
In Wishah v. Commissioner-General of the United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near 
East, the Applicant, a staff member with UNRWA, was charged 
by the local courts in Dier Al Balah, Jordan, with assault of 
family relatives in an altercation at a wedding.156 UNRWA 
suspended the Applicant from duty without pay, pending an 
investigation.  UNRWA undertook an investigation and ap-
pointed a Legal Aid Assistant from Gaza to investigate the al-
legations.  The investigator allegedly was a relative of the Ap-
plicant and the complainants. UNRWA concluded that the 
investigator had uncovered credible evidence to support the al-
legations of misconduct and decided to terminate the Appli-
cant’s employment for misconduct under UNRWA Area Staff 
Regulation 10.2.    
The Applicant appealed to the UNRWA Dispute Tribunal. 
In the UN Dispute Tribunal hearing, he requested an order for 
full disclosure of all documents pertaining to the investigation 
including the investigation report.  The UNRWA Dispute Tri-
bunal decided, after reviewing the contents of the investigation 
report, that it would disregard and remove the investigation 
report from the Applicant’s file and upheld the Applicant’s 
termination.  The Applicant was not given a copy of the inves-
tigation report.  The UN Appeals Tribunal held that the 
UNRWA Dispute Tribunal committed an error in procedure 
when it denied the Applicant’s request for a copy of the investi-
gation report.   
Due process requires, in the present case, that the staff member 
be able to assess by himself the relevance or irrelevance of the 
content of the investigation report, after a direct reading of it, as 
the Administration’s charges were mainly founded on that inves-
tigation, the characteristics and outcome of which were under 
                                                             
156 See Wishah v. Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief 
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, Judgments U.N. 
App. Trib., No. 2013/UNAT/289 (Mar. 28, 2013), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/oaj/files/unat /judgments/2013-unat-289.pdf. 
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discussion. When challenging a termination for disciplinary rea-
sons, the staff member is entitled to review by him- or herself the 
evidence used to support the conclusion of misconduct, to exam-
ine whether the fact finding conducted by the Administration in-
deed leads to the conclusions and the impugned administrative 
decision. If that opportunity is denied, due process of law is not 
respected, as it occurred in the present case. 
The UN Appeals Tribunal held that the Appellant had the 
right to make an assessment of the investigation report himself 
and the failure to provide the Appellant with the investigation 
report prejudiced his right to due process.  
When challenging a termination for disciplinary reasons, 
the staff member is entitled (a) to review the evidence used to 
support the conclusion of misconduct, and (b) to examine 
whether the fact finding conducted by the Administration ap-
propriately led to the conclusions and the impugned adminis-
trative decision.  If that opportunity to review the investigation 
report is denied, due process of law is not respected.  If the staff 
member is the person of interest in the investigation report, 
the staff member has the right to review and make an assess-
ment of the investigation report.  In this case, the UN Dispute 
Tribunal erroneously decided that the investigation report con-
tained no relevant material without giving the report to the 
Appellant.  The failure to provide a staff member who is a per-
son of interest in the investigation with an investigation report 
prejudices his right to due process.  
In Seddik Ben Omar v. the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, the Applicant made a number of serious allegations 
concerning the conduct of the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General for Iraq (SRSG).157 OIOS undertook an in-
vestigation into the 13 allegations made by the Applicant 
against the SRSG and found that only two of the Applicant’s 
allegations were substantiated.  OIOS further observed that 
the Applicant was imprecise and vague with providing infor-
mation to OIOS.  It is of note that the OIOS investigation was 
not of the Applicant’s behavior but of his complaints against 
the SRSG.   There was no obligation upon the Organization to 
disclose the results of the investigation to the Applicant, since 
                                                             
157 See Seddik Ben Omar v. the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
Judgments U.N. App. Trib., No. 2012/UNAT/26 (Nov. 1, 2012), available at 
http://www.un.org/ en/oaj/files/unat/judgments/2012-unat-264.pdf. 
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the he was not a person of interest in the investigation and the 
Report did not concern his conduct.  However, the Organization 
proceeded to place a Note on the Applicant’s OSF arising from 
OIOS comments on the Applicant’s behavior during the inves-
tigation.  
The placement of the Note on the Applicant’s OSF, which 
referred to the Investigation Report, gave rise to the obligation 
to share the investigation report with the Applicant. OHRM 
notified the Applicant of OIOS findings and informed him that 
a Note would be placed in this Official Status File referring to 
the OIOS observations, and that the Note also stated he should 
not be employed by the Organization in the future.  The UN 
Appeals Tribunal upheld the lower Tribunal’s decision that the 
placement of the Note in the OSF was unlawful since it re-
ferred to the OIOS Report, which the Applicant had not re-
viewed.  The UN Appeals Tribunal held that the investigation 
report had to be shared with the Applicant.  
In Featherstone v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
an investigation was conducted under the UN policy, “Prohibi-
tion of discrimination, harassment, including sexual harass-
ment, and abuse of authority” (ST/SGB/2008/5), and the man-
ager referred the case to the ASG, OHRM.158 The Applicant 
was informed that the ASG, OHRM, decided not to pursue dis-
ciplinary proceedings against her on the basis of the investiga-
tion report.  The Applicant repeatedly asked for the investiga-
tion report as well as other documents.  The Registrar of the 
ICTY did not address the Applicant’s request for access to doc-
umentary evidence since the ASG,OHRM had decided not to 
pursue disciplinary proceedings.  The Applicant was informed 
that the matter was closed and that no information was in the 
Human Resources file.  The Applicant raised the issue that she 
has a right to receive documentary evidence concerning the al-
legations brought against her, even though the matter was 
dismissed.  
The UN Dispute Tribunal held that Administrative In-
struction, ST/AI/371., Amend. 1, sections 5 and 6, clearly re-
strict the right of a staff member to receive documentary evi-
                                                             
158 See Featherstone v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judg-
ments U.N. Disp. Trib., No. 2012/UNDT/203 (Dec. 21, 2012), available at 
http://www.un.org/en /oaj/files/undt/judgments/undt-2012-203.pdf. 
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dence concerning allegations brought against him or her only to 
cases where the ASG, OHRM decides to pursue the case.159 The 
staff member did not have a right to access documentation 
from a disciplinary investigation if the ASG, OHRM decides not 
to pursue disciplinary proceedings.  The UN Dispute Tribunal 
held that Applicant has no right to obtain the investigation re-
port or any other documentary evidence when the case is 
closed.  
B. Staff member’s request to the UN Appeals Tribunal to 
produce documents  
In Bertucci v. the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
the OIOS launched an investigation into allegations of irregu-
larities that allegedly occurred with the Division for Public 
Administration and Development Management, Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, of which the Applicant was the 
Director.160 The Applicant was charged with negligence in the 
fulfilment of his managerial duties.  In the UN Dispute Tribu-
nal proceedings, the Applicant requested the Tribunal to allow 
him to access certain documents.   The UN administration re-
sponded that the documents were privileged and would not 
produce the documents to the UN Dispute Tribunal.  The UN 
Dispute Tribunal ordered the production of documents to de-
termine whether they should be disclosed to the Applicant.  
The Administration appealed to the UN Appeals Tribunal. The 
UN Appeals Tribunal upheld the UN Dispute Tribunal that the 
refusal to give the staff member access to the investigation file 
during UN Dispute Tribunal hearing was unlawful.      
The UN Appeals Tribunal determined that the Applicant 
had raised sufficiently serious questions before the United Na-
tions Dispute Tribunal, regarding the propriety of the process 
leading to the decision not to select him, to give the UN Dis-
pute Tribunal grounds for ordering the production of docu-
ments.  The UN Appeals Tribunal held that the case should be 
remanded for production of documents.    
                                                             
159 Revised Disciplinary Measures and Procedures 2010, supra note 30, 
at ¶ 5-6. 
160 See Bertucci v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judgments 
U.N. App. Trib., No. 2011/UNAT/121 (Mar. 11, 2011), available at 
http://www.un.org/en /oaj/files/unat/judgments/2011-unat-121e.pdf. 
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In Ahmed v. the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
the Applicant, a staff member with the United Nations Infor-
mation Centre in Islamabad, Pakistan, received a Performance 
Appraisal System (PAS) report within overall performance rat-
ing of “does not meet performance expectations.”161 The Appli-
cant filed a rebuttal to his PAS reports and in his rebuttal let-
ter he included allegations that his supervisor had isolated 
various staff member, including himself, to cover up “financial 
irregularities mismanagement and corruption” at UNIC.  An 
investigation was conducted by UNDP and found that there 
was no evidence to substantiate the allegations.  In the case be-
fore the UN Appeals Tribunal, the Applicant reiterated his al-
legations of corruption and financial fraud and submitted that 
he had been denied access to the reports of the OIOS on the in-
vestigations into his allegations.  The Applicant requested the 
UNAT to order the production of those reports.  
The UN Appeals Tribunal addressed the issue of the Ap-
plicant’s request to the Tribunal for production of the OIOS re-
ports.  The UN Appeals Tribunal referred to Article 8(1) of the 
UN Appeals Tribunal Statute, which states the Appeals Tribu-
nal may “order production of documents or such other evidence 
as it deems necessary, subject to Article 2 of the present stat-
ute”.  Article 2(5) of the Statute of the Appeals Tribunal pro-
vides that in exceptional circumstances, the Tribunal “may re-
ceive such additional evidence if that is in the interest of justice 
and the efficient and expeditious resolution of the proceedings”.  
In this case, the UN Appeals Tribunal referred to Calvani v. 
the Secretary-General and Bertucci v. the Secretary-General.162 
The Appeals Tribunal held that it has discretionary authority 
in the conduct of its proceedings and the production of docu-
ments would be granted for the purpose of achieving a fair and 
expeditious disposal of a case. The Appeals Tribunal held that 
in Ahmed it did not have sufficient reason to order the produc-
tion of documents.    
                                                             
161 Ahmed v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judgments U.N. 
App. Trib., No. 2011/UNAT/153 (July 8, 2011), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/oaj/f iles/unat/judgments/2011-unat-153.pdf. 
162 Calvani v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judgments U.N. 
App. Trib., No. 2010/UNAT/032 (Mar. 30, 2010), available at 
http://www.un.org/ en/oaj/unat/judgments/2010-unat-032e.pdf; see Bertucci v. 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, supra note 162.    
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XII. EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES 
A.  Anonymous Witnesses  
In Cohen v. the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
the Applicant was a staff member in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (MONUC) as a Procurement Assistant at the FS-4 
level.163 The Applicant was charged with “having solicited, re-
ceived and accepted sums of money from Transport Fluvial et 
Commerce (TFCE), a vendor who did business and sought to do 
business” with MONUC.164 The allegations made against the 
Applicant were forwarded to OIOS which referred that matter 
to the Procurement Task Force (PTF), an ad hoc investigative 
unit of OIOS created to address problems in the procurement 
processes in that UN.  The Applicant was interviewed and af-
forded the opportunity respond to the allegations.  The PTF 
provided the Applicant with its draft findings, which alleged 
that she had improperly solicited, accepted and received sums 
of money from TFCE.  The Applicant denied the allegations.    
The Director of the Administrative Services Division, Of-
fice of Mission Support, Department of Field Support, referred 
the case of the Applicant to OHRM with the recommendation to 
take appropriate disciplinary action. The Applicant was 
charged and responded that she lacked the authority to issue 
contracts and challenged the credibility of the witness and 
questioned the PTF’s reliance on his statement over the owners 
of TFCE and herself.  The Secretary-General notified the Ap-
plicant that she was summarily dismissed for serious miscon-
duct in accordance with Staff Regulation 10.2.  The case was 
referred to the Joint Disciplinary Committee which found that 
the summary dismissal was “not warranted by the evidence 
adduced in the PTF Report and that the facts underlying the 
charges have not been established.”    
The Applicant filed before UN Dispute Tribunal.  Accord-
ing to the UN Dispute Tribunal the summary dismissal was 
based on evidence allegedly told to the PTF investigators by a 
confidential witness, CW-4, who was also an employee of 
                                                             
163 Cohen v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judgments U.N. 
Disp. Trib., No. UNDT/2010/118 (July 12, 2010), available at 
http://www.un.org.en/ oaj/files/undt/judgments/undt-2010-118.pdf.   
164 Id. 
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TFCE, after the owners of TFCE refused to discuss the pay-
ment of bribes. By way of proof of alleged bribe-takings, CW-4 
is said to have shown the PTF investigators an index card on 
which he said he recorded payments made to the Applicant and 
some of her colleagues in the Procurement Section.   
The UN Dispute Tribunal found that a prima facie case 
was never made against the Applicant.  Reliance was placed on 
the witness’ version in deciding to dismiss the Applicant.  The 
witness, CE-4, was afforded anonymity from the Joint Discipli-
nary Committee, the Applicant, and the UN Dispute Tribunal 
were denied the opportunity to test the witness evidence.  The 
UN Dispute Tribunal questioned how the statements of the 
witness was placed in the investigative report and how the in-
dex card which was shown to the investigators as proof of his 
allegations was not included in the dossier of  the investigators.  
The UN Dispute Tribunal made a number of findings in the 
case to justify the recession of the summary dismissal, includ-
ing, “the Applicant was denied her due process rights in not be-
ing afforded an opportunity to test the veracity of her accuser 
CW-4”.  The UN Dispute Tribunal held that the OIOS/PTF in-
vestigation report was unfair and prejudiced against the Appli-
cant and “portrayed an unfortunate desperation to establish 
her guilt and unprofessionally served up accusations as facts in 
this case.”165 The UN Dispute Tribunal rescinded the decision 
to summarily dismiss the Applicant.  
The UN Appeals Tribunal reviewed the Dispute Tribunal’s 
decision in Cohen v. the Secretary-General of the United Na-
tions and upheld the decision to rescind the summary dismissal 
of the Applicant.166 The UN Appeals Tribunal accepted that the 
OIOS PTF investigation report had been unfair and prejudiced 
towards the Applicant and that the accusations as facts in the 
case where the staff member’s right to due process had been 
breached, such findings constituted aggravating factors in a 
case of irregular, prejudicial dismissal without corroborating 
evidence.  The UN Appeals Tribunal upheld the Dispute Tri-
bunal’s judgment but reduced the compensation for loss of 
earnings.  
                                                             
165 Id. at ¶ 70. 
166 Cohen v. the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judgments 
U.N. App. Trib., No. 2011/UNAT/131 (July, 8 2011), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/ oaj/files/unat/judgments/2011-unat-131e.pdf. 
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In Liyanarachchige v. the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, a staff member of the United Nations Operation in 
Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) was accused of sexual exploitation and 
abuse in violation of ST/SGB/2003/13, “Special measures for 
protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse”; improp-
er use of UN property for transporting passengers in a UN ve-
hicle; and conduct inconsistent with the obligations expected of 
an international civil servant.167 The Applicant was charged on 
the basis of evidence contained in the OIOS report.  The Appli-
cant challenged the decision of summary dismissal before the 
UN Dispute Tribunal.  During the trial, the UN Dispute Tribu-
nal in Nairobi heard the testimony of five witnesses, four wit-
nesses called by the Applicant and the fifth witness by the Sec-
retary-General.  Two witnesses who identified the Applicant 
from evidence of an OIOS investigator had been repatriated to 
the Philippines and did not appear.  The UN Dispute Tribunal 
upheld the summary dismissal noting that although the Appli-
cant had not been afforded the opportunity of confronting the 
two witnesses at the hearing, it had not undermined the adver-
sarial nature and fairness of the proceedings.  The Applicant 
filed an appeal to the UN Appeals Tribunal.   
The UN Appeals Tribunal held in Liyanarachchige v. the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations that a disciplinary 
measure may not be founded solely on anonymous state-
ments.168 In disciplinary matters, as in criminal matters, the 
need to combat misconduct must be reconciled with the interest 
of the defence and the requirements of adversary procedure. 
The UN Appeals Tribunal noted that the charges in this case 
were based solely on statements made to the OIOS investigator 
by anonymous witnesses.  The UN Appeals Tribunal held that 
the UN Dispute Tribunal erred in law by upholding the Secre-
tary-General’s decision to summarily dismiss the Applicant 
solely on the basis of the statements of anonymous witnesses.    
However, the UN Appeals Tribunal noted that in certain 
cases anonymous statements may be used as evidence, in excep-
                                                             
167 Liyanarachchige v. the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
Judgments U.N. Disp. Trib., No. UNDT/2010/041 (Mar. 9, 2010), available at 
http://www.un.org/en /oaj/files/undt/judgments/undt-2010-041.pdf. 
168 Liyanarachchige v. the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
Judgments U.N. App. Trib., No. 2010/UNAT/087 (2010), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/oaj/ files/unat/judgments/2010-unat-087e.pdf. 
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tional cases, because of the difficulties in establishing the facts, 
if such facts are seriously prejudicial to the work, functioning 
and reputation of the Organization.  The Organization may 
need to maintain anonymity for the protection of the witness.  
The UN Appeals Tribunal decided that if it is possible to verify 
the circumstances surrounding anonymous witness statements 
and to allow the accused staff member to effectively challenge 
such statements, the Appeals Tribunal may allow the anony-
mous statements to be admitted into evidence.   
B. Right to Cross-Examination of Witnesses  
In the case of Applicant v. Secretary-General of the United 
Nations the Appeals Tribunal decided upon the issue of wheth-
er a staff member facing summary dismissal has the due pro-
cess right to confront and cross-examine those making allega-
tions against him or her.169 The Applicant was a staff member 
with UNICEF as Chief of the Southern Sudan Water and Envi-
ronmental Sanitation Section.  Several young male security 
guards employed by an external security company complained 
that the Applicant sexually touched them and filed written 
complaints.  An investigator was appointed to conduct a formal 
investigation into the Complainants allegations.  The investi-
gation report concluded that there was clear and convincing ev-
idence that the Applicant had “inappropriately touched” wit-
nesses C1, C2, C3 and C5, which amounted to sexual 
harassment.   
During the hearing, the UN Dispute Tribunal interviewed 
the Investigator who testified that the Complainants did not 
testify “because the (Secretary-General) could not produce any 
of them.”   The UN Dispute Tribunal concluded that the “sanc-
tion of summary dismissal was based on unsubstantiated 
charges”, since the witnesses could not be found to testify. The 
UN Dispute Tribunal determined that the evidence of the in-
vestigation should be discounted since the truth of the contents 
of the statement could not be tested by cross-examination in an 
open hearing.  The Dispute Tribunal decided that it was in er-
ror the Respondent not to provide any of the witnesses for judi-
                                                             
169 Applicant v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judgments 
U.N. App. Trib., No. 2013/UNAT/302 (Mar. 28, 2013), available at 
http://www.un.org/en /oaj/files/unat/judgments/2013-unat-302.pdf. 
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cial scrutiny but merely to submit oral statements gathered in 
an investigation.     
The UN Appeals Tribunal overturned the lower court’s de-
cision and held that the facts established by the evidence 
showed sexual harassment, even without the Applicant’s con-
frontation of the witnesses. 
Judicial review of a disciplinary case requires the UNDT to con-
sider the evidence adduced and the procedures utilized during 
the course of the investigation by the Administration.170  In this 
context, the UNDT is “to examine whether the facts on which the 
sanction is based have been established, whether the established 
facts qualify as misconduct (under the Staff Regulations and 
Rules), and whether the sanction is proportionate to the of-
fence.171    
The UN Appeals Tribunal held that as a general principle, the 
importance of confrontation, and cross-examination of witness-
es is well-established. As noted in Molari v. Secretary-General 
of the United Nations, “disciplinary cases are not criminal.  
Liberty is not at stake.”172 The Appeals Tribunal held that due 
process does not always require that a staff member defending 
a disciplinary action for summary dismissal has the rights to 
confront and cross-examine his accusers.   Under certain cir-
cumstances denial of the right to cross-examine witnesses does 
not necessarily flaw the entire process.  In the instant case, the 
Appeals Tribunal determined that it proved impossible for the 
Administration to produce the Complainants to testify and be 
cross-examined before the Dispute Tribunal.  The United Na-
tions operates globally and in certain situations staff can be 
highly transient.  The Appeals Tribunal accepted that the Or-
ganization was unable to produce witnesses in the South Su-
dan almost five years after the incidents.  The Tribunal held 
that the key elements of the Applicant’s rights of due process 
were met: (1) the Applicant was fully informed of the charges 
against him, (b) he was informed of the identity of his accusers 
and their testimony; (3) he was able to mount a defense (5) and 
he was able to call into question the veracity of their state-
                                                             
170 Messinger v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judgments 
U.N. App. Trib., No. 2011/UNAT/123 (Mar. 11, 2011), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/oaj/ files/unat/judgments/2011-unat-123.pdf. 
171 See Masri, supra note 143.   
172 See Molari, supra note 136. 
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ments.  The Appeals Tribunal was satisfied that the interest of 
justice was served in the case despite the Applicant’s inability 
to confront the persons who had given evidence against him 
during the initial investigation.  
 The Appeals Tribunal distinguished the Applicant’s case 
from Liyanarachchige v. the Secretary- General of the United 
Nations in which the Tribunal concluded that “a disciplinary 
measure may not be founded solely on anonymous state-
ments.”173 In the Applicant’s case the statements of the Com-
plainants were neither anonymous nor the only evidence 
against the Applicant. Since the Applicant knew the identities 
of the Complainants and other witnesses, he was able to pre-
pare a defense to each of the alleged incidents.  In determining 
the credibility of the Complainants, the UN Dispute Tribunal 
erred in focusing on minor inconsistencies in their statement 
rather than on the clear and convincing evidence established 
by the record.  The Appeals Tribunal vacated the UN Dispute 
Tribunal judgement and held that the Applicant’s misconduct 
warranted summary dismissal.  
XIII.   PROSECUTION OF STAFF MEMBERS IN LOCAL COURTS  
In Manokhin v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
the staff member was summarily dismissed for engaging in a 
visa fraud scheme and in unauthorized outside activities.174 
The staff member was alleged to have taken part in a fraudu-
lent scheme involving the provision of documentation to spon-
sor citizens of Uzbekistan and other countries to obtain visas to 
enter the United States ostensibly for the purpose of attending 
conference of the United Nations.  The United States authori-
ties, who were investigating the external criminal matters, 
searched the Applicant’s office at the United Nations and dis-
covered documents suggesting that the Applicant was involved 
as a commodity trading advisor.  The OIOS conducted its own 
investigations, as distinct from the United States criminal in-
vestigation, and concluded that he had operated the company 
                                                             
173 Liyanarachchige, supra note 170. 
174 Manokhin v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judgments 
U.N. Disp. Trib., No. UNDT/2009/006 (Aug. 13, 2009), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/oaj/ undt/judgments/undt-2009-006.pdf (not appealed to 
the UNAT). 
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from his office at the UN and that he had used his status as a 
member of staff of the UN as a supplementary guarantor in re-
lation to outside activities. The Applicant was indicted in the 
United States District Court Southern District of New York for 
wilfully and knowingly conspiring with other individuals to vio-
late the laws of the United States.   The Applicant was found 
guilty and sentenced to serve one year in prison for immigra-
tion fraud scheme to fraudulently procure United States entry 
visas for non-U.S. citizens while he was a UN employee.  
In the UN Dispute Tribunal deliberations on the Appli-
cant’s appeal against the sanction of summary dismissal from 
the UN, the Applicant alleged, inter alia, that he was the vic-
tim of entrapment by OIOS.  The UN Dispute Tribunal noted 
that the UN authorities carried out its own investigations, as 
distinct from the investigation of the US authorities in connec-
tion with the criminal proceedings.  The Dispute Tribunal con-
sidered that the primary concern was the thoroughness and in-
tegrity of the internal UN investigatory procedures.  The 
Dispute Tribunal considered the primary issue for the internal 
UN administrative disciplinary proceedings was whether the 
UN provided a full and fair opportunity for the Applicant to de-
fend himself and whether the evidence obtained was sufficient 
to sustain the disciplinary findings.   The UN Dispute Tribunal 
concluded that the internal disciplinary investigations com-
plied with the “principles of natural justice.”  The Applicant 
was accorded his due process rights and there were no proce-
dural irregularities in the investigation and the sanction of 
summarily dismissal was proportionate to the misconduct.    
In a case where there is a concurrent judicial proceeding in 
local courts, the UN Dispute Tribunal will conduct an inde-
pendent judicial review of the facts and procedures of the case 
to determine whether the disciplinary measure was appropri-
ate.  Manokhin v. Secretary-General of the United Nations does 
not address the instance where the Organization has separated 
the staff member for misconduct and the local courts have dis-
missed the case for lack of sufficient evidence.  However, it 
must be noted that the standard of proof in the UN for a disci-
plinary case is that of “clear and convincing evidence”; and the 
standard of proof in a local jurisdiction criminal trial is “beyond 
a reasonable doubt”.  This distinction must be considered since 
the UN has a limited power to only dismiss a staff member 
76http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss2/2
TAMARA SHOCKLEY (DO NOT DELETE) 7/14/2015  4:40 PM 
 
2015]      INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES OF THE UN    545 
 
 
from employment, and the local courts has the power to im-
prison and take away the liberty of a person.  This distinction 
in standard of proof and penalties in the local courts requires a 
separate and independent investigation by the UN.  
XIV. DAMAGES FOR MORAL AND PROFESSIONAL INJURY DUE TO 
AN INADEQUATE INVESTIGATION 
In Gambari v. the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
the Applicant sought to be compensated for moral and profes-
sional injury and damage to her reputation caused by the con-
duct of the investigators in the investigation and disciplinary 
proceedings.175 In an action against an individual and/or Or-
ganization for defamation of character, the burden lies on the 
Applicant to prove defamation to the Tribunal.   The UN staff 
rules and regulations require that investigations and discipli-
nary proceedings be carried out with a high degree of confiden-
tiality.  Where the staff member’s reputation is injured because 
the responsible officials have breached the required confidenti-
ality, compensation might be considered.  The Dispute Tribunal 
held in Gambari, that the Applicant did not present sufficient 
evidence beyond making the assertion of defamation.  The Ap-
plicant did not present evidence to corroborate her emotional 
distress and its impact on her health as a result of the actions 
of the Organization’s investigation.    
In Gambari, the Applicant showed in her pleadings and 
other documents the emotional suffering and depression she 
underwent and how she was treated for depression in New 
York, Dubai and Abidjan.  However, the Applicant did not ten-
der medical records to support this claim.  The OIOS investiga-
tion report recorded that the Applicant told the investigators 
that the difficulties she had experience and by February 2005, 
she suffered from depression and required hospitalization. The 
Applicant’s references to her depression pre-dated the investi-
gation, disciplinary proceedings and the involvement of the Or-
ganization. The UN Dispute Tribunal found that a case had not 
been made out by the Applicant to warrant the award of com-
pensation for any injury to her health caused by the OIOS in-
                                                             
175 Gambari v. the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judgments 
U.N. Disp. Trib., No. UNDT/2012/193 (Dec. 6, 2012), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/oaj /files/undt/judgments/undt-2012-193.pdf. 
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vestigation.  
In Marshall v. the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
the Secretary-General appealed against the award of compen-
sation to the Applicant for non- economic harm and moral 
damages.176 The UNDT awarded 24 months’ net base salary for 
“the substantial and grave mishandling by the Administration 
in this matter”, as well as nine months’ net base salary for “the 
stress and moral damages suffered.  
The Appeals Tribunal held that UN Dispute Tribunal 
erred in awarding compensation to the Applicant.   The 
UNDT’s erroneously found that the Organization was not enti-
tled to investigate the allegations and that the Organization’s 
role ought to have been limited to being the conduit through 
which the Applicant and other staff member’s disputes could 
have been directed “to the relevant authorities, namely a fami-
ly court”.   
  The UN Appeals Tribunal held that the Dispute Tribunal 
erred in its conclusion that the decision taken by the Admin-
istration to investigate the allegations of misconduct amounted 
to an abuse of power and an invasion of the Applicant’s privacy.  
The Organization had a legal entitlement to take action in this 
case.   
In Abboud vs. the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
UNAT -2012-100, the UN Dispute Tribunal awarded damages 
acknowledging that the Applicant had suffered no economic 
loss and that no actual damage existed.  The UNDT awarded 
damages awarded because the request for an investigation was 
treated with unseemly disdain, subject to insult, patronizing 
comments and retaliatory threats.   The UN Dispute Tribunal 
stated that the matter was incommensurable, and that it was 
not a case of punitive damage and that there was no intent to 
punish the Organization.   
The UN Appeals Tribunal overruled the Abboud decision of 
the UN Dispute Tribunal based on Article 11 of the UNDT 
Statute.  Article 11 establishes that “[t]he judgments of the 
Dispute Tribunal shall be issued in writing and shall state the 
reasons, facts and law on which they are based”.  In  Abboud,  
                                                             
176 Marshall v. the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judgments 
U.N. App. Trib., No. UNAT/2012/270 (Nov. 1, 2012), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/oaj/ files/unat/judgments/2012-unat-270.pdf. 
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the UNDT awarded damages – a relief which the Applicant had 
not requested - without stating the facts and law underlying 
this decision. The Appeals Tribunal therefore vacated the 
award of damages.     
XV. CONCLUSION 
What is the role of OIOS investigations in the United Na-
tions?   It is fundamental that internal investigations must 
have as its core mandate the purpose to determine whether any 
improprieties or wrongdoing has occurred in the Organization.  
The most significant benefit of a good internal investigation is 
that it enables management to determine whether there are 
any problems with corrupt staff, organizational structure, or 
administrative policies and procedures.  An internal investiga-
tion provides UN management with an essential tool of over-
sight to identify any necessary changes to ensure on-going 
business operations and to disclose potential misconduct, which 
may affect staff moral and bad publicity among the Member 
States.  
The United Nations has field duty stations all over the 
world, especially in geographic regions where there are differ-
ent languages, cultures, customs and ethnic issues.  Some 
countries have developed formalistic rule of law structures and 
other countries have informal legal systems which are factors 
that affect the ability to thoroughly investigate the allegation.   
OIOS must apply its investigative needs and priorities to each 
situation in a given country, especially with the cultural and 
legal differences as well as in difficult locations where the UN 
may not be widely accepted by the local communities.  
The UN Judicial Tribunals provides an impartial and in-
dependent forum for the resolution of disputes between the 
staff member and the Organization.   The UN Dispute Tribu-
nals and the UN Appeals Tribunal has earned the UN interna-
tional community’s public trust as they balance the need for re-
spect for the individual rights of the staff member and the need 
of the Organization to conduct internal investigations on 
breaches of the employment relationship.  The UN Judicial 
Tribunals must lead the justice system in resolving staff and 
management disputes over internal investigation procedures.  
Indeed, the evolving jurisprudence of the UN judicial system 
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has led to OIOS conducting internal investigations more care-
fully to ensure a proper, timely investigation to minimize the 
risks and costs of staff litigation before the UN Judicial Tribu-
nals.    
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